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Introduction

Living Friendship

Freedom surely lives at the heart of friendships. I hope most of us can identify with Etta Mae's arrival at her old friend Mattie's home:

> She dumped her load on the sofa and swept off her sun-glasses. She breathed deeply of the freedom she found in Mattie's presence. Here she had no choice but to be herself. The carefully erected decoys she was constantly shuffling and changing to fit the situation were of no use here. Etta and Mattie went way back, a singular term that claimed co-knowledge of all the important events in their lives and almost all the unimportant ones. And by rights of this possession, it tolerated no secrets. (Naylor, 1991)

We feel comfortable in the presence of our close friends. We earn and jointly create the freedom of our friendships. Time together, straightforward talk, shared stories, and mutual respect produce the "co-knowledge" cradling friendship. I believe that friends do retain some secrets because of needs for privacy and respect for each other's vulnerabilities (Rawlins, 1983a, 1983c). Yet friends also co-create deep understandings allowing for shared moral visions and rights unique to

their friendship. Ann Patchett keenly captures this special private domain with her friend Lucy Grealy:

> Our friendship was like our writing in some ways. It was the only thing that was interesting about our otherwise very dull lives. We were better off when we were together. Together we were a small society of ambition and high ideals. We were tender and patient and kind. We were not like the world at all. (Patchett, 2004, p. 73)

This book examines the unique spaces, the singular worlds that friends accomplish. I will probe the contingencies of friendships: their vulnerabilities and contributions to the larger social contexts in which they occur, the similarities and differences they recognize and suppress, their storytelling and dialogues, their shared and risked identities. Though offering peace, friendships are seldom completely placid. There is always more to friendship than two persons' lives.

Around 10 years ago I read a newspaper story that I haven't been able to forget. It seems a man living in a small town in the midwestern United States, who I'll call Hank, was about to go bankrupt. However, Hank had come up with a solution to his financial problems that he confided to his best friend, who I'll call Barry. Hank informed Barry that he had decided to set fire to his own business. He figured that the insurance settlement on the total loss would clear up his debts and put him in pretty good shape to start fresh with another venture. Soon after their conversation, Hank torched his store. Unfortunately, the flames destroyed more than he planned. Before the local fire department could extinguish the blaze, it burned down most of the block of buildings making up the economic center of the small town where they both lived. Due to the circumstances of the fire and some incriminating evidence about its cause, Hank was charged with arson.

As you might imagine, the trial created quite a stir in the little town. Despite the worrying revelation of Hank's financial straits during the proceedings, townspeople had trouble believing that an upstanding citizen like Hank would do such a thing. Influenced by an effective case for the defense, public opinion began to question the evidence of arson. This swing was occurring even though legally clarifying the fire's causes would facilitate reparations made to the other destroyed businesses. Monitoring the events closely, Barry was torn. On one hand, he was Hank's longtime friend whom Hank had entrusted with the guilty secret. Most of us would agree that the loyalty and confidence of friendship is a sacred trust. Close friendship is one of the things that make life worth living. What kind of person

would betray his best friend's trust? On the other hand, what Hank did was wrong. To make matters worse, Hank's self-serving, premeditated action had caused fellow citizens considerable trauma and economic damage. What kind of citizen would protect such information and turn his back on his home community when it deserves justice? Where did Barry's true loyalties lie in this situation? Well into the trial, Barry decided to come forward and reveal that Hank had confided his intentions to him. Deeply moved and visibly upset, he told reporters after his testimony that while he cared about his friend like a brother, he felt the results of Hank's actions went beyond the trust of two friends. Barry felt he would never be able to look the people of his hometown in the eye if he did not tell the truth about the fire's cause.

What would you have done? For some time I have discussed this story with students and friends and not everyone's answers are the same. This story raises some of the questions about friendship that I address in this book. For one thing, people want to know more about the friends' conversation. Did Hank approach Barry for his opinions on the plan, or did he simply declare it as a foregone conclusion? Hank clearly trusted his friend's confidence, but did he seek Barry's judgment before making the decision? Did Hank consider the burden he imposed on Barry by confiding this criminal intention? How much thought did Hank give to the position in which he was placing Barry? What about Barry? Did he just passively listen to Hank's plan? Or did he question his friend, engage him in dialogue, and urge him to consider other scenarios? Did he play out other stories that might influence Hank to think differently about his current situation, his financial options, or the consequences of this drastic action? How these friends went about *making choices* is an important consideration.

This story also poses larger questions about the relative duties of personal friendships pursued in private versus broader civic friendships conducted in public. Under what conditions does one of these relationships exert the greater claim on us when pitched against each other? Do our duties to our community surpass our duties to our close friends as in the case of Barry and Hank? Or should our loyalties to our close friends trump our duties to our community?

Cross-cutting tensions between duty to the collective and loyalty to specific friends arise in particular circumstances. One famous example involves Brutus and Cassius, supposedly trusted friends of Julius Caesar, assassinating Caesar because they believed their action was for the greater good of Rome. "Et tu, Brute?" bespeaks Caesar's sorrowful awareness of his personal friend's betrayal. As a result, in *The Inferno,* Dante placed Brutus and Cassius in the innermost rings of Hell for

their violation of personal friendship. Dante believed they belong in the hottest part of Hell because they betrayed their loyalty to their particular friend out of perceived duty to the impersonal state. In dramatic contrast, Cicero saluted friends who upheld their duties to the Roman state over personal loyalties. He believed there cannot be a viable state if people do not place duty to it above their personal attachments. Indeed, the private moral visions of friends can promote factions and divisiveness within the collective order. In this book I consider further the cross-cutting pressures that can arise between impersonal duties to broader collectives versus caring for the needs of personal friends. Sometimes our friends may act selfishly as in Hank's case. In other cases, our friends who challenge the impersonal political order may be courageous forerunners of necessary social changes.

What considerations would you find important in choosing between your close friend and the demands of your larger social world? Maybe you presumed that Barry and Hank lived in a homogeneous community. In this case if Barry identified closely with everyone else involved because of their similarity to him, perhaps it was easier for him to act for the greater good of his community. After all, a lot of folks just like him had suffered. But what if he and Hank had always been excluded because of their racial, ethnic, or religious differences, or their sexual orientation? What if they had been oppressed as a devalued minority due to their shared differences from the larger community? What if Hank's business endeavors took place in a constant struggle against powerful prejudice? Do any of these factors change how you feel about Barry's choice to testify against him? What if Hank had been systematically denied opportunities by the townspeople because of his differences while Barry was the only person in town who became his friend despite their differences? How do you regard Barry's decision now?

Instead of these two men, what if the story involved a man and a woman? Hank and Mary are the longtime friends. What differences, if any, would this make in your perceptions of Mary's decision to testify against Hank? What if Hank was a woman named Hanna? How would you evaluate Barry's decision to renege on Hanna's trust? What if both friends were women? How do perceived similarities and differences between the friends and vis-à-vis the larger community interact to shape identities, perceptions of relationships, and responses to others? How do the activities of friends relate to matters of social justice? Who (including you, the reader) identifies with whom in these various scenarios, on what bases, and with what consequences?

Why is friendship positioned at these flashpoints? How does friendship simultaneously relate to our identities as individuals and to

our participation in larger groups? How is it that we use the same word "friendship" to describe a gamut of relationships from close dyadic bonds to diverse public connections of varying lengths of time and degrees of involvement? The word "friendship" typically implies benign meanings. How does friendship sustain its benevolent, even moral, connotations? Discussions of friendship as a guide to proper conduct appear in numerous contexts. Authors recommend the values of friendship as a moral model for the relationship between family members (Lindsey, 1981), authors and readers (Booth, 1988), co-authors (Lunsford & Ede, 1987), researchers and participants (Newbold Chinas, 1993; Tillmann-Healy, 2003), teachers and students (Jackson & Hagen, 2001; Rawlins, 2000), academic advisors and students (Rawlins & Rawlins, 2005), lawyers and clients (Fried, 1976), and physicians and patients (D. N. James, 1989). What gives friendship this flexibility of application across contexts? What meanings of the term remain consistent and which ones change? What ethical connotations are implied by describing relationships as friendships?

Aristotle (1980) devotes two books of his *Nicomachean Ethics* to friendship. He describes two broad forms reflecting different contexts of friendship—*true friendship* and *civic or political friendship.* Both forms involve distinctive qualities and demands. Even so, in actual practice the two forms overlap in significant ways to compose evolving intersections of social participation. Aristotle extends his notions of true dyadic friendship in describing civic friendship. Civic friendship is equally important because communities where people demonstrate good will, address common concerns, and dwell in peace as political friends enable the continuing possibility of dyadic friendship (Hutter, 1978). The fates of personal and political friendships interweave in actual human circumstances.

True friendship (which I also call close or personal friendship) involves distinctive characteristics for Aristotle (1980). Personal friendship occurs between specific individuals and involves *concern for the other person for his or her own sake.* Suttles (1970) terms this the "person-qua-person" orientation of friendship. In close friendship we desire good things to happen to our friend because we care about this particular person. The activities composing personal friendship occur for the most part in private settings out of public eyes and ears. For Aristotle true dyadic friendships also involve *mutual well-wishing,* which includes reciprocated concern and actions to benefit each friend. They jointly experience the gratifications of their friendship. However, Aristotle holds that true dyadic friendships only occur between persons (he said men) who are alike in virtue. In their purest form such

friends duplicate each other's essential qualities; a friend constitutes "another self." I consider problems associated with his presumptions of similarity and privilege throughout this book. I give them particular attention in Chapter 7 when considering limitations of Aristotle's notions of political friendship.

Aristotle (1980) contrasts true dyadic friendships with those of utility and of pleasure. The latter are inferior kinds of friendship in which individuals primarily use each other for personal gain or gratification. Consequently, such friendships end when they expend the bases for utility or pleasure. While true friends also share pleasure and can assist each other, Aristotle notes a different primary motive. It is their pursuit of the good life together in light of their mutual well-wishing as intrinsically worthy persons. Close dyadic friendships are the primary focus of Chapters 3 through 6 of this book and are perhaps what contemporary people typically think of when friendship is mentioned.

By comparison, *civic or political friendship* describes a stance toward a number of other persons who occupy shared places and times. The practices of civic friendship connect citizens as friends in public settings and discourses. Such friendships are characterized by *good will.* Political friends wish each other well in their activities as persons occupying commonly held spaces. They actively support each other's performances as citizens through behaving in ways that sustain a hospitable environment for interaction. Of matching importance, political friends devote themselves to pursuing a *common good.* They do things together primarily to serve purposes that transcend the specific desires of the individuals or subgroups performing the actions. Acting as political friends, they orient toward something more encompassing than their individual selves—a commonly recognized good. While they do not necessarily share the same interpretations of the common good, they realize that a larger cause and a broader constituency of similarly concerned citizens benefit from their efforts. Although civic friends may personally enjoy the positive results of their cooperative actions, they do so primarily as members of a political community, not as detached individuals.

Neither communicating good will nor pursuing a common good is first and foremost a personal disposition or merely an emotional tendency (Hansot, 2000). Rather, each is a practice that we choose to perform as a consequence of choosing to live in civic or political friendship with others. Importantly, these practices are not devoted restrictively to others as specific individuals who display idiosyncratic attributes or desires. They are activities performed in concert with other community members with an eye toward sustaining a commonly occupied space in ways that recognize and benefit all participating citizens. Living in

political friendship with others involves our ongoing efforts to display good will toward our civic friends and to pursue actively common concerns. When conducted properly, civic friendship provides a basis for belonging as citizens but also a basis for responsible freedom.

Despite their obvious differences, both personal and political friendships suggest benevolent, hopeful orientations toward social life. The concern for a specific other person practiced in personal friendship broadens into the generalized sense of good will practiced in civic friendship. Likewise, the mutual well-wishing performed in personal friendship expands to focus on a common good in civic friendship. We purposefully remove ourselves from responses to specific individuals and concentrate on a broader, shared enterprise. Meanwhile, a social context of civic friendship can facilitate the possibility of personal friendships, even though dyadic friendships are not a necessary or desirable consequence across all public circumstances.

The virtues and vexations of friends' communication have captivated me for 30 years (Rawlins, 2007). In trying to understand the contradictory, situated practices of friends' interaction, I turned early on to a dialectical perspective. From my first presentation of dialectically informed insights (Rawlins, 1979) through early research reports (Rawlins, 1983b, 1983c) to delineating a theoretical account of the perspective (Rawlins, 1989a) to applying dialectical thinking to friendships across the life course (Rawlins, 1992), I have found it to be an enriching, evolving orientation for inquiry. I briefly review this dialectical perspective below. While I have found these dialectical principles helpful in understanding the predicaments and possibilities of friendships, I consider it unproductive to conceive of any fixed, primary set of dialectical tensions. Indeed, it is quite incompatible with the volatile energies and the changing, contextual understandings of dialectics to do so (Henry, 1965; Rawlins, 1998b). Lured by questions of friendship, I devote much of this book to probing *the dialectic of individuation and participation* for the first time. Chapter 2 describes *individuation* as identifying an individually embodied self or a social group as a distinct entity separate from others. Communicating individuation occurs concurrently with *participation,* identifying self or groups as relational entities necessarily connected with others. In conversation with insights provided by dialectical thinking, I detail in Chapter 3 and exemplify in Chapter 4 the interconnections of storytelling and dialogue characterizing friends' discourse.

The dialectical perspective employed here involves four basic elements: totality, contradiction, motion, and praxis (Rawlins, 1989a). *Totality* highlights the vast interrelations constituting social life. All

friendships are affected by social and political forces. In turn, friendships influence all areas of society. *Contradictions* are incompatible yet mutually conditioning aspects producing the dynamic pulse of human relationships. For example, as we noticed in the story of Barry and Hank, the contradictory demands on friends can arise from simultaneous, opposing private and public responsibilities. *Motion* describes relationships as always changing from barely noticeable to dramatic ways. Stasis is an illusion; communicative life inherently responds to discourses already in play. People grow closer and farther apart, affecting and affected by big and small personal and external events. *Praxis* describes the private and public world-shaping reflexivity of social action. Constrained by and responding to our circumstances, we make active choices as subjective agents. Our choices create objective conditions that we must then address. We are simultaneously subjects and objects of our own communicative actions. What objective conditions requiring response did Hank and Barry create for themselves as a result of their actions? How did Barry's testimony shape his and Hank's choices for the rest of their lives? All of our choices both open up possibilities and constrain further choices between our friends and in society.

I have previously described six dialectical tensions in the ongoing communicative achievement of friendships (Rawlins, 1989a, 1992). The *dialectic of the private and the public* articulates the tensions of friendships occurring across a considerable range of social relationships. Friendship can arise voluntarily as a freestanding bond, or as a dimension of other relationships like marriage, family, neighborhood, work, and politics. We choose our friends within the constraints of our situations. Dyadic friendships are subject to review by other more normatively located relationships. Friendship occupies an uncertain position in the hierarchy of relationships because it *complements, fuses with, competes with, or substitutes for* these other personal and social relationships (Hess, 1972). For example, between people who are musical composers, sports teammates, scholars, or politicians, friendship can *complement* the otherwise professional or instrumental relationship. In contrast, becoming friends might *compete* with the organizational requirements and expectations of a superior/subordinate arrangement. Further, friendship can *fuse* so completely with spousal or sibling bonds that it becomes difficult to decide which type of relationship is being enacted. Finally, when we are without kin, friends may *substitute* for our family (M. Friedman, 1992; Lindsey, 1981). The peculiar *double agency of friendships* allows them to course in and out of private and public life, simultaneously serving (and risking) personal and social integration (Rawlins, 1989b, 1992).

The *dialectic of the ideal and the real* expresses the interplay between the cultural ideals of friendships and their problematic achievement in concrete circumstances. Important ideals of human relationships are associated with friendship across times and cultures (Aristotle, 1980; Brain, 1976; Paine, 1969). Across cultures friendships embody esteemed qualities of human relationships, including trust, loyalty, generosity, and concern for the other's welfare for his or her sake (Aristotle, 1980; Brain, 1976; Krappmann, 1996). A humanizing blend of personal autonomy and social participation lives at the heart of friendship. Friendship can foster responsive and responsible freedom. Our choice to befriend others enhances the relationship's ethical significance (M. Friedman, 1992). In contrast to categorically enforced, compulsory duties, we voluntarily negotiate the covenants of friendship. Fulfilling our freely chosen obligations to one another as friends attests to our very characters as social beings and our capacities to make promises to others (Grunebaum, 2003).

Aspiring to equality also characterizes friendship. Friends seek ways to treat each other as equals despite differences in personal characteristics or social circumstances. The practices of equality constitute one of friendship's staunchest ethical potentials. Finally, the mutuality of friendship simultaneously benefits the other as well as the self. Paine (1969) asserts that the notion of a bargain takes on a different meaning between friends. He states, "Expressed as a bargain, A, in his concern with *his own side* of a bargain with B, is, in friendship, *also concerned with* B's, and vice versa" (p. 512, original emphasis). We acknowledge self-regarding concerns but view them as fundamentally altered by the mutuality of our friendship (Mills & Clark, 1982; P. H. Wright, 1984). However, friendships are mostly unprotected by legal, kinship, or religious sanctions. They are actively negotiated in personal and political contexts and highly susceptible to their social circumstances. Accomplishing the ideals of friendship requires facing the realities of cultural life.

I refer to *the dialectic of the freedom to be independent and the freedom to be dependent* as "the dialectic of conjunctive freedoms." This dialectic is a vital focus of this book. Acting upon these contradictory freedoms uniquely positions friends' activities of individuation and participation in accomplishing their identities together (Rawlins, 1983b; Wiseman, 1986). Friendship is founded upon connected, responsible, positive freedoms. It requires unforced yet mutually contingent choices to respond to each other as friends. Friendship cannot be demanded. Between friends, exercising the freedom to be independent creates distance from the requirements of the friendship; it asserts individuation.

We pursue distinct projects and utilize our singular potentials. Yet our friend simultaneously grants this freedom with confidence in our participation in shared friendship. Our freedom to be independent is experienced in conjunction with our freedom to depend on our friend. We understand our separation as a moment within an ongoing relationship that includes the open invitation to call upon our friend.

The *dialectic of affection and instrumentality* formulates the tensions between caring for and using friends. As Aristotle (1980) notes, friendship's affections ideally involve caring for others as an end-in-itself. Regarding our friend merely as a means to self-serving ends, rather than serving the friend's well-being, sullies the ideals of disinterested affection for our singular friend. Meanwhile, participation in friendship includes relying on others for assistance and to complete ourselves even as others rely on us to fulfill themselves (Bakhtin, 1990). Friendship arises from affection for one another for our own sake (individuation) *and* as a way to belong and prosper with others (participation).

The *dialectic of judgment and acceptance* formulates important challenges within friendships to appraise who we are and who we should become. Because our friends know us well, they perceive us in ways that confirm our own self-perceptions, including our faults and virtues. Our friends accept us for who we are. However, this acceptance arises in light of evaluative standards that we have negotiated. As Rothleder states, "Both creation and judgment are integral parts of friendship" (1999, p. 117). We judge *with* our friends, and we judge each other (Beiner, 1983). In their best moments, friends perform the intertwined motivations of judgment and acceptance as *compassionate objectivity* (Rawlins, 1992). Friends deliberate with us and help us to know where we stand. They compassionately discern differences that matter in our lives even as they affirm meaningful similarities.

The *dialectic of expressiveness and protectiveness* describes the contradictory impulses to be open and candid and to be responsibly discreet in communicating with friends. With friends we speak our thoughts and feelings directly. Even so, across situations we recognize matters about ourselves that should remain private as well as issues that our friends consider too sensitive or volatile to discuss (Rawlins, 1983a, 1983c). Forming friendships involves engaging these dialectical challenges in a benevolent spirit. We experience these dialectical tensions of friendship as creative but often demanding opportunities to respond to valued persons.

Living in a world increasingly divided by differences, we are bombarded with examples of corporate greed and daily violence. We live in times of harried personal lives, diminishing existential connection, and

increasing alienation. In these disheartening circumstances, I believe that communicating as friends offers hopeful alternatives. In this spirit, I examine *the compass of friendship* in this book. I intend two meanings of the word "compass." First, I mean the extent to which we can realistically apply friendship's ethical ideals across private and public contexts. What is the practical reach of friendship? What is offered by extending the hand of friendship across the spaces between self and other? How far can we project the humane spirit of friendship in proposing commonalities, recognizing and spanning significant differences? Second, I mean the capacities of friendship for offering moral guidance in our personal and public lives. How can friendship's ethical practices contribute to making choices as individuals and political communities that constructively shape the courses of human events?

Calling others friends involves adopting a benevolent stance toward them. It also means negotiating mutually recognized standards for action. Friends communicate in ways that serve individual needs in some situations and combined interests in others. The combination of ideal expectations and situated achievement of enriching communicative practices leads me to characterize the finer moments of communication between friends in terms of narrative and dialogue. Friendships occur along continua. There is considerable range in the ways that the attributes of friendship discussed in this book are actually realized in specific relationships. While based on friends' choices and practices, all friendships remain highly susceptible to the enabling and constraining features of their circumstances.

Soberly acknowledging limitations, I view friendship as offering compelling ideals and concrete practices for grappling ethically with the challenges of contemporary life. This book explores potential contributions of communicating as friends for constructing identities, dealing with differences, and pursuing well-lived lives. I consider the rewards and challenges of friendship as an interpersonal relationship. I also examine the ethical potentials and limits of political friendships for building meaningfully inclusive communities. Throughout the book I emphasize the capacities of communicating in a spirit of friendship for co-creating and making choices with others.

In developing the positions offered here, I address narratives of friendship from my own life and the lives of persons who generously have shared their lived experiences with me. Informed by Bateson's (1972) notion that all communication contexts are contexts of learning about our diverse premises for communication, I have placed few boundaries on my learning activities in writing this book (Rawlins, 2007). I have drawn upon scholarly essays and research reports across

humanistic and social scientific disciplines. I have also studied short stories, novels, and plays shedding light on the joys and predicaments of friends. Newspaper and magazine articles, screenings and transcripts of television programs and movies, everyday conversations recalled or recorded with others, spontaneous and planned interviews, Internet sites, reflections on my own life and the lives of students I am fortunate to co-learn with—all of these discourses inform and enliven this book.

The next two chapters after this introduction outline conceptual foundations. Chapter 2 states my assumptions about human communication underpinning this book. I describe how perceptions of similarities and differences shape communication about selves and others. I introduce the notions of *individuation* and *participation* and examine their dispiriting and edifying modes for co-constructing identities. Chapter 3 relates storytelling and dialogue as vitally interwoven communicative activities within friendships. I envision the ongoing communicative achievement of friendship as involving *a dialogue of narratives and a narrative of dialogues* shaping the identities of friends. Chapter 4 exemplifies these practices of storytelling and dialogue using the afternoon conversation between two lifelong, women friends. Chapter 5 cross-examines undergraduate students' arguments concerning the possibility versus impossibility of enduring, close, cross-sex friendships. Invoking artifacts from North American popular culture and lived experiences, their discussions display gendered identities, sexual orientations and identities, and narratives of romance and the well-lived life. Chapter 6 investigates cross-race friendship between blacks and whites. I exemplify the predicaments and possibilities of bridging racial boundaries through interracial friendships using a literary depiction, published autobiography, and interviews with a male and a female pair of interracial friends. Chapter 7 inspects the ethical profile of friendship. I then consider the potentials and limitations of political friendships for pursuing social change. Chapter 8 surveys the compass of friendship in light of the previous chapters. It reminds readers how friendship embodies an invitation to dialogue, co-create stories, learn together, and make choices across contexts. It assesses the potentials of personal and political friendships for promoting individual and collective identities and well-being.

Thus, this book begins with two chapters of conceptual discussion, and moves through three chapters focusing on dyadic friendships. Yet in discussing dyadic cross-sex and cross-race friendships, I increasingly must address the enveloping discourses and sociocultural contexts that enable and constrain their existence. Acknowledging personal friendships' susceptibility to contextual factors, Chapter 7

necessarily examines ethical and political potentials of friendship for accomplishing social change. Across the book we are drawn from personal and private to political and public contexts of friendship.

Friendships are questions of degree. They exist on a panoramic continuum of everyday contingencies conditioning the participating friends' well-being. Static definitions of friendship fail to capture the lived actualities of friendships—their finitude, flexibility, and fragility. Friendships can present elusive dreams and evaporating hopes hampered by concrete conditions and divisive cultural prejudices. However, they also involve the reassuring presence, the helpful hands, or the tough truths gifted to *this* person when she or he most needs it by someone who cares about that person. They involve as well the groups of concerned citizens who voluntarily share the work of defying the unjust development in a neighborhood, the threats to the safety of children, the needless violence of a polity, and the destruction of our ecosystem.

Let us now explore the situated capacities of friendship to address significant similarities and differences in edifying ways, to help people integrate and distinguish public and private identities and responsibilities, and to make thoughtful, constructive choices. Living friendship requires and facilitates learning, humility, relational integrity, thoughtfulness, and always becoming with others.