


ENVIRONMENTAL CORRECTIONS

A New Paradigm for Supervising Offenders in the Community



1

Why Offender Supervision Does Not Work

Over the past four decades, mass incarceration has been the elephant in the room of corrections. During this period, state and federal prison populations increased dramatically, from under 200,000 to over 1.5 million. When jail populations are included, the daily count of incarcerated Americans reaches more than 2.2 million—or 1 in every 108 adults in the nation (Glaze & Herberman, 2013; Pew Center on the States, 2008a). Understandably, a rich body of work has arisen to account for this seemingly intractable willingness to place fellow citizens behind bars (see, e.g., Clear & Frost, 2014; Garland, 2001; Gottschalk, 2006; Pratt, 2009; Tonry, 2004).

Another critical correctional development, however, has been overshadowed by this concentrated focus on mass imprisonment: the rise of *mass community supervision of offenders* (Clear, 1992). Thus, in 1980, about 1.34 million offenders were on probation (1.1 million) or parole (220,438). By 2012, this figure had ballooned to almost 5 million Americans. The probation population had increased by almost 3 million offenders to 3,942,800, whereas the parole population had increased by over 620,000 offenders to 851,200. In concrete terms, this means that on any given day, 1 in every 50 adults in the United States is under some form of community supervision (Glaze & Herberman, 2013).

The question that arises is whether supervision matters—that is, in the parlance of the day, whether it “works” to reduce recidivism. This issue matters because of the sheer number of offenders whose lives will be touched by correctional control, and whose criminal habits can be affected by this system (McNeill & Weaver, 2010). Further, due to the ongoing financial crisis, states are looking for opportunities to trim their budgets. Criminal justice expenditures have not been immune, and state prison populations declined for the first time in 38 years in 2009 (Pew Center on the States, 2010). With limited resources available, state officials are now looking to

probation and parole to supervise offenders either diverted or released early from prison. In short, the policy and practical salience of community corrections is likely to rise in the time ahead.

Some evidence exists that in terms of recidivism, probation is as effective as a custodial sanction as incarceration (Cullen, Jonson, & Nagin, 2011; Nagin, Cullen, & Jonson, 2009). Although not plentiful, other research finds that compared to being free in the community, probation supervision diminishes criminal participation (MacKenzie, Browning, Skroban, & Smith, 1999). Even so, evidence has been slow to come indicating that beyond the mere fact of being on probation, specific supervision strategies or styles regularly produce lower recidivism rates (recent exceptions may include intensive monitoring leading to higher rates of technical violations or procedural justice supervision orientations having positive intermediate outcomes for offenders; Paparozzi & Gendreau, 2005; Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Skeem & Manchak, 2008).

In traditional discussions, it is proposed that officers perform two functions—the delivery of treatment and the exercise of control—either of which might be used to reduce offender recidivism. There is increasing knowledge about “what works” when it comes to offender treatment (Andrews & Bonta, 2010). The challenge for corrections is implementing such evidence-based practice in the field and, in particular, how to use probation and parole supervision as a conduit for treatment delivery. A growing body of research has uncovered several effective rehabilitative strategies for offenders supervised in the community (Craig, Dixon, & Gannon, 2013; Cullen & Gilbert, 2013; Gleicher, Manchak, & Cullen, 2013), and many of these treatments are being applied in the field with early evaluations of success (Bonta et al., 2011; Luong & Wormith, 2011; Robinson et al., 2012).

Our primary concern here, however, is with the other side of offender supervision: control. Specifically, how can the control orientation of probation and parole be enhanced to improve offender outcomes? Traditionally, in this control role, officers are expected to exercise what amounts to a policing function. Their job is to watch offenders and, if they break prescribed rules—whether criminal laws or conditions of supervision—to revoke their community status and send the wayward to prison. The policing or control function works best when the mere threat of punishment evokes compliance. This proposed outcome is based on the notion of specific deterrence: that threats or the application of sanctions scares offenders straight, either in the short term or, after a stay in prison, in the long term. Such policing is supposed to be most effective when it is intensive, and when officers have small caseloads so they can apply close surveillance to offenders. Unfortunately, studies show that vague, deterrence-oriented intensive supervision does not work (see, e.g., Cullen, Wright, & Applegate, 1996; MacKenzie, 2006; Petersilia & Turner, 1993).

Given this stubborn reality, what might officers do differently? Answering this question—how to prevent recidivism among supervisees—leads us to consider why criminal acts occur. The simple but revealing answer is that two conditions must be present: An individual must have the *propensity* to offend and must have the *opportunity* to offend. The factors that underlie the propensity to recidivate have been researched (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Gendreau, Little, & Goggin, 1996).

These risk factors, sometimes called “criminogenic needs,” are what should be targeted for treatment intervention. Thus, one answer to what we should do differently is to use evidence-based treatment to reduce an individual’s propensity to commit crime.

By contrast, relatively little is known about what officers might do to “knife off” the crime opportunities of probationers and parolees (Cullen, Eck, & Lowenkamp, 2002). Nonetheless, there is an extensive body of theory and research, drawn from the field of “environmental criminology” (sometimes called “crime science”) regarding opportunity reduction. This at times falls under the umbrella of “situational crime prevention.” Importantly, this perspective eschews legal deterrence, whose application is often uncertain and occurs far after a crime might be committed, in favor of strategies that steer offenders away from criminal opportunities or that block them from availing themselves of opportunities that might exist.

Thus, a second answer to what we should do differently is to use the insights of *environmental criminology* to create a supervision style that seeks to reduce offenders’ access to opportunities needed to engage in crime. Importantly, this approach is not anti-propensity or anti-treatment. Propensity matters, and efforts should be made to use treatment programs to blunt it. But simultaneously, probation and parole officers should be equipped with the conceptual knowledge and practical technology to work with offenders to reduce their access to crime opportunities. In this sense, *the control function of supervision should be transformed from a deterrence orientation to an opportunity-reduction orientation*. The purpose of this book is to explore how this might be accomplished.

In so doing, we follow this roadmap. The current chapter reviews four topics. First, a brief discussion is provided of the invention of probation and parole, with a special interest in the treatment and control functions of the officers’ role. This discussion will include an assessment of the role of current-day officers. Second, evidence is presented on the limited effectiveness of offender supervision. This will focus on rates of recidivism and technical violations. Third, the analysis will consider the effectiveness of offender treatment. A case will be made that much supervision either brokers inappropriate services or provides no services whatsoever. By way of contrast, an effort will be made to outline what effective offender supervision should involve. This analysis will be based on the principles of effective correctional intervention. Fourth, research will be reviewed that demonstrates the ineffectiveness of deterrence-oriented offender supervision. In particular, evaluations of control-based intensive supervision programs will be examined. This discussion will furnish a rationale for moving away from this approach toward supervision that is focused on *opportunity reduction*.

In this regard, the remainder of this volume articulates what such a paradigm shift in offender supervision would entail. Thus, Chapter 2 introduces the field of environmental criminology, exploring how it leads to practical programs to reduce crime. Chapter 3 uses this information to outline a new strategy for supervising offenders that is based on opportunity reduction. Chapter 4 seeks to present assessment technology that can be used by probation and parole officers to discern where, when, why, and with whom offenders commit crimes and to use this information to target the intervention at reducing criminal opportunities. Chapter 5 argues

that the line between treatment and control may be largely artificial, asserting that cognitive-behavioral therapy can be expanded to develop opportunity-reduction elements. Chapter 6 explores how probation and parole can rely on the police to further limit supervisees' crime opportunities. Finally, Chapter 7 makes a broader case for moving beyond current, failed methods of supervising offenders and embracing a new vision to assist offenders resist the seductions of crime.

The Invention of Probation and Parole: Treatment and Control

From their inception, probation and parole supervisors have faced the challenge of competing goals. Often cited as the father of probation, John Augustus encountered this frustration, struggling to reconcile an offender's prospect of change with the person's known history of offending. As is still common today, Augustus selected individuals whom he believed would be amenable to rehabilitation, and would require little in the way of crime prevention (Dressler, 1962). Through the mid-1800s, Augustus earned bail (probationary release) for nearly 2,000 offenders and was held accountable by the court for their outcomes. Upon advising the judge of the offenders' progress, Augustus was required to demonstrate that the offenders had earned their freedom and did not require a prison sentence; this was achieved by showcasing the positive changes the offenders had undergone (such as gaining employment or reducing antisocial influences), and the diminished threat to public safety born from scrupulous supervision (Augustus, 1852/1972).

The emergence of parole experienced similar strains, having to balance conflicting ideas about what produces desistance: treatment or control. Observed in Alexander Maconochie's experiment with a mark system on Norfolk Island, as well as with Sir Walter Crofton's Irish ticket of leave system, offenders could progressively lease their liberty following a period of incapacitation (Barnes & Teeters, 1959; Eriksson, 1976; Hughes, 1987). Given their behavioral history, offenders were subjected to rigorous discipline in an effort to suppress further criminal acts. Yet at the same time, in order to prepare the offenders for an unsupervised life, treatment was required, and the gradual return to society included prosocial activities expected of an upstanding citizen. As seen in the Elmira Reformatory system, discretionary release from prison (under an indeterminate sentence) resulted from prosocial institutional behavior. This reformation was believed to be instigated by both individualized remedies for an offender's shortcomings and corporal punishment for misbehavior (Brockway, 1926; Pisciotta, 1994; Wines, 1919).

These innovations in corrections occurred following the Age of Enlightenment, which ushered in the Classical School of criminology. These theories, based largely on the humanitarian writings of Cesare Beccaria (1764/1963) and Jeremy Bentham (1789/1948), promoted a new philosophy of punishment that moved away from retribution and toward deterrence. According to this utilitarian framework, humans operate according to a rational consideration of the potential costs and benefits of

a potential action; the outcome of this hedonistic calculus can be influenced by the threat of punishment, particularly when such pains are certain, swift, and severe. These ideas were countered, however, by the introduction of the Positivist School of criminological theory, wherein various biological, psychological, and sociological factors are identified as the origination of criminal behavior. These two dominant approaches to understanding (and thus controlling) criminality are inherently at odds; one emphasizes threats of punishment and the general reduction of the benefits of crime, while the other advocates for a reversal of criminogenic variables. Hindsight reveals that the pendulum of correctional theory has swung from conservative to liberal orientations, guided by cultural contexts; at some points in history, Classical theories have reigned supreme, whereas at others, Positivist theories have been favored (Cullen & Gilbert, 1982; Cullen & Jonson, 2012; Rothman, 1980; Taxman, Henderson, & Lerch, 2010).

For generations, the promotion of individualized intervention dominated correctional theory (Blomberg & Lucken, 2010). Treatments sought to distinguish those factors that promoted crime within each offender, and then present reform tailored to the individual (Rothman, 1980). Yet the use of indeterminate sentences, in which offenders could earn their freedom by showing evidence of their reform and desistance from crime, was flawed for two central reasons. First, a medical model (in which criminality is “diagnosed” and “fixed”) is reliable only insofar as expertise is available and put to use, which correctional interventions of the time were lacking. Next, the assumption that practitioners would employ their newfound discretion toward the goals of reformation was shortsighted. The discovery of these shortcomings brought ideological challenges from contrasting political interests (Cullen & Gilbert, 1982), which influence the crisis in correctional philosophies seen still today. The correctional revolution of the 1970s was greatly influenced by the surrounding social turmoil, as a public atmosphere of distrust caused most to scrutinize the ability of the state to manage offenders (Rothman, 1980). As if almost historically fated, Martinson’s (1974) scathing critique of rehabilitative programming provided the necessary ammunition for both political parties to confirm what they had already believed (Cullen & Gendreau, 2001; Cullen & Jonson, 2012). Despite the methodological flaws within his study (and later contradictory findings), Martinson’s mantra of “nothing works” was propelled into public rhetoric.

Although there was unity in the demand for reform, conservative and liberal representatives diverged on why reorganization was needed, and how best to achieve change (Cullen & Gilbert, 1982). As a result of this disagreement, offender supervision practices still suffer from ideological *and* practical schisms. The social chaos present within the 1960s led conservatives to demand “law and order.” Many believed that claims of rehabilitation were an insincere charade by which offenders would be coddled, and this lenient handling of dangerous offenders was jeopardizing public safety. To remedy this dilemma, they called for an increase in sanction certainty (determinate sentences) and severity (tough-on-crime initiatives) to deter offenders. Contrarily, the liberal minded believed that rehabilitation promoted injustice, insofar as the state could not be trusted to employ its discretion responsibly. In their calls for reform, liberals maintained their promotion of offender treatment, but

through the safeguard of determinate sentencing (with shorter terms and additional legal protections). If rehabilitation was to be embraced, it must be through the medical model's adage: Above all, do no harm.

These two directions created a virtual impasse. The resulting crisis in corrections, coupled with increasing offender populations and associated costs, required a solution. As with the attack on rehabilitation (Cullen & Gilbert, 1982), support from opposing political parties birthed dramatic and swift change (Cullen & Jonson, 2012). Conservatives desired punitive programs that spared expenses, while liberals aspired to divert offenders from the evils of incarceration (Cullen et al., 1996). Consequently, the 1980s experienced a surge in a reliance on community-based punishments. Community control programs were campaigned as commonsensical (Cullen, Blevins, Trager, & Gendreau, 2005), meeting the desires of each political party. These sanctions were intertwined with two competing value systems: an increase in monitoring and control (combined with the threat of imprisonment for failure to comply), coupled with aimless but undamaging treatment.

It is debatable whether either of these strategies is capable of independently decreasing re-offending (MacKenzie, 2006), as discussed in the subsequent section. In any event, it is important to note that these two conflicting tactics have produced significant role strain for offender supervisors. Probation and parole officers have long embodied different styles of supervision, producing a number of role typologies. Of principal concern are the punitive or law enforcement officer and the welfare or therapeutic officer (Allen, Carlson, & Parks, 1979; Ohlin, Piven, & Pappenfort, 1956). The embodiment of one of these frameworks (to the logical sacrifice of the other) may be the consequence of an officer's personality, the clientele being supervised, the political culture of the time or place, or the aims of the organizing agency (Bonta, Ruggie, Scott, Bourgon, & Yessine, 2008). Over the past few decades, an important shift has occurred, in which these two incongruous functions have melded together (Feeley & Simon, 1992).

Unfortunately, this role conflict may not easily be resolved. Many passionate arguments have been forwarded in favor of sacrificing one goal of supervision to save the other (Taxman et al., 2010). That is, the treatment model should be sacrificed to focus on control (Barkdull, 1976), or the law enforcement stance should be eliminated to emphasize rehabilitation (Stanley, 1976). Regardless, the task of supervising offenders under community corrections must be completed, whether officers are under strain or not. Caseload management (especially meticulous recordkeeping) is a bureaucratic necessity (West & Seiter, 2004). Particularly in an era of increased populations with decreased resources, probation and parole officers are required to be efficient as opposed to effective (Feeley & Simon, 1992). Contemporarily, the dominant supervision style is the synthetic or combined model, in which surveillance and social services are at play simultaneously (Klockars, 1972; McCleary, 1978; Skeem & Manchak, 2008; Taxman, 2011).

Consequently, offender supervision has reached a period of stagnation. Officers must balance two seemingly incompatible goals—treatment and control—often forcing them to choose one to the detriment of the other. Furthermore, the day-to-day functions of the organizing agency leave officers in the position of passive

brokers simply trying to meet the overwhelming demand (Solomon, Waul, Van Ness, & Travis, 2004; Turner, 2010). These factors undoubtedly influence the efficacy of offender supervision. The persistent juggle of rehabilitation, social service brokerage, enforcement, and case management encountered by probation and parole officers has produced an atmosphere of atheoretical community corrections. As a result of trying to be everything to everyone, it is of little surprise that current eclectic models of offender supervision are ineffective.

The Limited Effectiveness of Offender Supervision

Although offender supervision was not previously perfected, there is little doubt that the addition of 3.5 million community corrections clients over the last 30 years has hamstrung efforts to effectively supervise offenders in the community (Glaze & Bonczar, 2011). As Feeley and Simon's (1992) classic piece on the new penology has demonstrated, population growth has contributed to pivotal changes in correctional rhetoric, goals, and strategies. Former expressions of clinical diagnosis and retributive justice have been replaced by the colder, calculating idioms of probability and risk. This has resulted in de-emphasizing individualized approaches to offender monitoring and welfare. In essence, previous objectives of management and rehabilitation have been replaced by a systemic requirement: efficient control. In an attempt to balance competing approaches, offender supervisors have largely regressed into *bureaucrats*—hardly the stance required in community corrections *interventions* (MacKenzie, 2006; West & Seiter, 2004).

Official statistics demonstrate the product of such a stalemate in correctional philosophies (see Glaze & Bonczar, 2011). In 2010, 65% of probationers were recorded as successfully having completed their term of supervision. Among parolees, only half were successfully discharged, with 33% being reincarcerated while under community supervision. Within three years of release from prison, two thirds of parolees are re-arrested for a new offense, with more than half of these returning to prison due to a technical violation of the conditions of their supervision (Langan & Levin, 2002). Among those offenders released from prison in 2005, nearly 50% had a probation or parole violation or committed a new crime that led to imprisonment within just three years (Durose, Cooper, & Snyder, 2014). The re-arrest rate for property offenders is particularly telling, with about three quarters being arrested for a new offense. Given this failure rate, some studies have simply concluded that community supervision does not help to reduce the re-arrest rates of offenders at all (Solomon, Kachnowski, & Bhati, 2005; cf. MacKenzie & Li, 2002).

This is not to say that there are no benefits accrued from community corrections; yet, the central goal most highly demanded—unambiguous recidivism reduction—is not being achieved at an acceptable level (for a discussion of the difficulties in operationalizing and measuring recidivism, see Maltz, 1984). Despite variation in the motivation of such requests, whether practical or political, there is an expectation that offenders supervised in the community will desist, no matter

the impetus (Boone & Fulton, 1996). There is certainly considerable controversy regarding how to meet this goal, often divided along party lines, which mimics the impasse in guiding strategies experienced by community corrections officers. In essence, the voracious debate surrounding whether public safety can be enhanced best by controlling offenders or by rehabilitating offenders seems inherent to discussions about supervision. Worse yet, it is often presented as intractable. Reasonable consideration births the realization that these two competing and “incompatible” demands are both necessary, but insufficient; the crime prevention strategies of surveillance and treatment cannot be sacrificed one for the other.

As street-level policymakers (Lipsky, 1980), the actions taken by probation and parole officers in their routine work implicate certain correctional philosophies. Community corrections can no longer tolerate practices in which the selected model of offender supervision is an afterthought, a byproduct of bureaucracy, or purely incidental to aimless decisions already made. The lack of a cohesive and directive theory of effective probation and parole is a disgrace. Community corrections officers are in a prime position to be agents of offender change, and while small discoveries of “best practices” in offender supervision are emerging, the absence of a guiding framework has undesirable consequences for offenders and their communities. Consequently, a paradigm shift in community corrections is required.

The “organized skepticism” generally observed in social science research and public policy (Cullen & Gendreau, 2001; Merton, 1973) is peculiarly absent from probation and parole practice. As empiricists, criminologists must scrutinize the validity of the available evidence, and should be particularly cynical when long-held maxims are replaced by sudden shifts in ideology (Engel & Atkisson, 2010). Yet after multiple generations of experimenting with deterrent and rehabilitative correctional philosophies, the evidence is conclusive: The current product of offender supervision, a hodgepodge of dispassionate and half-hearted exercises of control and treatment, *does not work*. The strong influence on correctional practice previously exercised by the rehabilitative ideal and the tough-on-crime movement has faded, making this the ripest time for innovation. The unproductive standards in probation and parole have been allowed to dominate practice (and resulting outcomes) for too long—something new must be done.

The unconvinced and ideologically allegiant may point to the isolated and limited efforts in community corrections that have achieved positive outcomes. Indeed, there is a growing base of knowledge, grounded in research evidence, that indicates that certain practices *can* reduce crime. But these are often aimless in their impact without an organizing theme to promote the use of the larger strategy in which the one effective practice ought to be embedded. More often, techniques employed under the guise of deterrence or rehabilitation theories are awfully conceptualized, implemented, and exercised (Gendreau, Goggin, & Smith, 1999; Latessa, Cullen, & Gendreau, 2002; Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Smith, 2006; Rhine, Mawhorr, & Parks, 2006). Both control and treatment are necessary tactics for effective offender supervision, and must (and can) be used in conjunction with one another. Yet to complement one another, each must first be a worthy

contributor to probation and parole practice independently. As it currently stands though, neither approach, alone or in combination with the other, is suited to significantly and consistently reduce recidivism.

Why Treatment Does Not Work

The fall and reemergence of the rehabilitative ideal is a curious story, with vivid implications for community corrections practices. The way in which the “nothing works” hysteria framed subsequent debates over the efficacy of rehabilitation has been largely unreasonable. For generations, scholars have unfairly categorized highly variant programs into one subsuming pigeon hole, measuring their success only by bottom-line, dichotomized measures of recidivism (Boone & Fulton, 1996). Yet despite these unproductive tendencies, limited treatment efforts persisted. Simultaneously, new analytic techniques made a synthesizing evaluation of these interventions possible. Over the past two decades, several meta-analyses have indicated that, although many rehabilitative efforts were null to modest in impact, others showed promise that they *could be* highly effective. Across studies, a clear pattern emerged, demonstrating that “interventions that are based on social learning or behavioral principles, are structured rather than nondirective, seek to build human capital in offenders, and use more than one treatment modality to address the multiple problems that offenders may be experiencing” generate the most success at reducing recidivism (Cullen, 2002, p. 266). Given the heterogeneity observed in treatment effects, a new goal emerged, beyond “proving” that rehabilitation did not work. Specifically, researchers sought to unpack the black box of treatment, uncovering those variables that moderate the influence of programming on outcomes (Bonta et al., 2008).

This alteration in the discipline’s tone led to the theory of effective correctional intervention, in which the factors known to provide successful treatment were identified (Andrews, 1995; Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Cullen, 2002; Gendreau, 1996). The three components of this paradigm include an empirically guided psychology of criminal conduct, technology that ensures that the theory is implemented with integrity, and three principles that contribute to reduced recidivism (Cullen & Smith, 2011). In particular, effective rehabilitation programs correspond with the risk, need, and responsivity principles. First, interventions ought to target high-risk offenders, which will be recognized through the use of standardized assessment instrumentation (as opposed to the less reliable clinical appraisals of risk). Next, treatment must evaluate the offender’s criminogenic needs. Empirical research must identify and interventions must address those dynamic risk factors that contribute to the individual’s criminality. Finally, the third principle demonstrates that only those approaches that are receptive to offenders and their risk factors ought to be used. As such, “treatment programs should be delivered in a manner that facilitates the learning of new prosocial skills by the offender” (Gendreau, 1996, p. 123), both generally (in terms of the treatment modality, with cognitive-behavioral techniques as the gold standard) and specifically (in reference to the capabilities of the individual).

As an increasing number of programs have begun to incorporate these principles, additional factors have demonstrated their influence on the effectiveness of treatment (Andrews, 1995). Specifically, a social psychological understanding of criminal conduct has revealed multiple treatment specifications that are aligned with the contingencies of learning theories of behavioral conditioning (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Spiegler & Guevremont, 2009; Van Voorhis, Braswell, & Lester, 2009). Individualized treatment, therapeutic integrity, community settings, after-care, social support, and quality program development and implementation will all be strongly related to successful programs (Gendreau, Cullen, & Bonta, 1994; Harper & Chitty, 2005). With an increase in the knowledge of effective correctional interventions also comes information on what consistently will *not* work to reduce re-offending. As Andrews (1995) notes, criminal sanctioning without accompanying treatment cannot be expected to diminish criminal behavior. Gendreau (1996) elaborates, citing how efforts to “punish smarter” remain replete with failure. Simply, programs that emphasize punishment fail to alter those characteristics believed to birth criminal behavior, and are consequently doomed to be unsuccessful (Cullen & Gendreau, 2000; Cullen, Pratt, Micelli, & Moon, 2002; Latessa et al., 2002; MacKenzie, 2006).

Thinking about face validity alone, the theory of effective correctional intervention can logically reduce recidivism. Rather than relying upon an implicit supposition that has no criminological underpinnings, the theory advanced in the coming chapters attempts to redress the *known* factors that sustain criminal conduct (Andrews & Bonta, 2010). Those programs that conform to the risk, need, and responsivity principles consistently achieve reductions in recidivism of around 25% to 50% compared to those offenders not receiving treatment (possibly higher, depending on the control group; Cullen, 2002; Cullen & Gendreau, 2000; Lipsey, 1999). Given this noteworthy accomplishment (and the unfortunate number of programs that do not subscribe to the principles of effective correctional intervention), future efforts must work toward technology transfer and theory fidelity (Cullen & Jonson, 2011). Future “professional ideologies” for offender supervisors ought to allow evidence-based corrections to provide information on how best to combat recidivism, striving for program integrity and motivated application. Provided the strong impact rehabilitation *can have* on reducing re-offending, failure to incorporate these principles ought to be considered professional malpractice (Cullen, Myer, & Latessa, 2009; Latessa et al., 2002).

And indeed, that is precisely what is noted in contemporary probation and parole organizations. We do know what works, yet recidivism rates persist largely unaltered. Three prospective explanations for this exist. First, it is possible that policymakers and practitioners are simply unaware of the principles and their corresponding techniques that are known to limit re-offending. Second, it is possible that relevant parties are aware, and choose to ignore them; reasons for this may relate to political pressure, tradition or professional pride, perceived resource limitations, disagreement over ideology, or anecdotal evidence to the contrary. Third, it is possible that probation and parole agencies are knowledgeable of the standards of effective intervention, but implement them poorly (Lowenkamp, Latessa,

& Smith, 2006). Whatever the case may be, it is clear that with our burgeoning understanding of how to successfully treat offenders, the current way of doing business is unacceptable.

In response to this charge, many practitioners would passionately insist that they *do* treat their offenders, but the desired results are not achieved. This is often blamed on the offender population, the lack of resources, and poor interagency cooperation. It is here that the central shortcoming of existing treatment efforts in community corrections becomes clear: These “treatment” attempts *will not work* if they are not aligned with the principles of effective correctional intervention; that is, community corrections services being delivered without adherence to these principles *cannot* reduce recidivism (Andrews, Zinger, et al., 1990; Gendreau et al., 1994). Examining these principles in turn, we can see where existing probation and parole treatment often falls short.

First, the risk principle maintains that treatment ought to be targeted at high-risk offenders. Clearly, offenders at greater susceptibilities of recidivating require a more intensive intervention than those less likely to re-offend (Baird, 2009; Lipsey & Wilson, 1998). Furthermore, when low-risk offenders receive concentrated attention, rates of recidivism often increase (Latessa & Lowenkamp, 2006). This is due to three primary reasons: exposure to stable criminal associates (and the learning/reinforcement that accompanies these associations), disruption of the prosocial factors that cause them to be low-risk, and risk of victimization by more predatory offenders (Lowenkamp & Latessa, 2004). Importantly, to faithfully abide by the risk principle, proper assessment and classification processes must be integrated into offender supervision practices. The assessment of risk must be systematized and actuarial in nature (Bonta, Wallace-Capretta, & Rooney, 2000; Latessa & Holsinger, 1998), and the classification of offenders must be generally allegiant to the determinations of risk revealed by these assessments. Moreover, offenders’ level of risk should be determined prior to the delivery of services, and should be reassessed periodically to make reclassification decisions as necessary.

Within current probation and parole practices, a number of divergences from the standards of the risk principle are noted. Most notably, offenders are often indiscriminately grouped together, with little (or no) regard to their level of risk. Even aside from objective recidivism risk, approximations of risk (such as offense history, offense severity, and treatment/sanction history) are often likewise ignored in the allocation of caseloads and assignment to program participation (Petersilia, 2003). Despite the fact that treatment programs are in short supply, offenders are typically enrolled equally irrespective of the degree of intervention they actually require. The neglect of actuarial risk assessments is also problematic. A number of practitioners abide by the alleged infallibility of their clinical judgment, with little use of validated instruments (Latessa, 1999). And while many agencies use intake assessments, these often are unquantifiable, are unreliable and have not been validated, may not be properly scored, or target only concrete needs unrelated to criminogenic risk (Latessa & Holsinger, 1998). Further, in the rare organizations in which re-offending risk estimations are calculated, the information is often not properly employed (Burke, 2004). The distribution of cases to supervising officers

can be determined by multiple characteristics (e.g., randomly, even number of cases among agents, by demographics or tangible needs unrelated to offending), though seldom is client allocation the result of risk assessments. In summary, failing to assess and classify offenders by level and type of risk will make it difficult to produce positive desistance-related outcomes (Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006). To not follow appropriate assessment and classification processes is nothing short of “correctional quackery” (Latessa et al., 2002).

Next, the need principle establishes that if criminal recidivism is to be reduced, the instigators or contributors of criminality must first be minimized (Andrews, 1989). This logical assertion also implies that reduced criminogenic needs are a desirable intermediate goal; that is, continued criminality can be prevented in the long term only if the characteristics causing the individual’s offending are altered, making their periodic measurement worthwhile (Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990; Gendreau, 1996). The known causes of crime, consistently demonstrated by hundreds of empirical studies, include antisocial attitudes, antisocial associates, an antisocial personality pattern, and a history of antisocial behavior (note that this final risk factor is not dynamic, and therefore cannot be changed by corrections authorities; Andrews & Bonta, 2010). If probation and parole authorities desire to reduce recidivism, then supervising officers must address these dynamic criminogenic needs in their clients; a failure to do so cannot practically limit re-offending (Bonta et al., 2008; Dowden & Andrews, 1999). Notably, in order to target the causes of offending, agents must accurately assess the actual criminogenic needs of their clients. Moreover, there must be legitimate follow-through on the factors determined to contribute to recidivism risk. Contemporary fourth-generation assessments incorporate both risk and needs (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; see also Chapter 4 later in this volume); by thoroughly investigating the criminogenic needs of offenders upon intake and periodically through their supervision, the level of risk can be measured and adjusted as needed.

Unfortunately, however, existing community corrections efforts frequently fail to assess and target *criminogenic* needs. As Harland asserts, “For a field that by almost anyone’s definition is so centrally involved in the management of risk and in responding to criminogenic needs of offenders, the continuing neglect or inadequate appreciation of the importance of this area in so many correctional agencies is little short of astounding” (1996, p. xvi). Frankly, the majority of programs do not adequately assess offender risks and address criminogenic needs (Matthews, Jones Hubbard, & Latessa, 2001). When offender risks and needs *are* assessed, they often indicate static factors (i.e., those incapable of being changed), or indicate concrete needs that are, at best, only indirectly related to offending (e.g., housing stability). This is not to say that officers cannot use information about an individual’s history of victimization or unemployment, but this leaves unaddressed the underlying roots of criminality (Bonta et al., 2008).

Emphasizing service brokerage, or providing atheoretical or nondirective treatment, is not good enough (Latessa, 1999). Indeed, probation and parole agencies often coordinate “treatment” for their clients, but it is unrelated to criminological knowledge (notably misguided programs include pet therapy, cosmetic

surgery, yoga/meditation, and control- or punishment-oriented interventions). Yet the research is clear: When rehabilitative programming does not operate in accordance with the need principle (that is, the precise causes of offending are being addressed), recidivism cannot be substantially affected (Andrews, Zinger, et al., 1990; Antonowicz & Ross, 1994). So much so, in fact, that addressing an offender's criminogenic needs is a necessary step toward safeguarding public safety (Crowe, 1998). The stark majority of community corrections programs do not explicitly measure and target for change those characteristics that cause the individual's crime; as such, they are designed to fail (Cullen, 2002).

Third, the responsivity principle conveys that the mode of treatment delivery must be sensitive to the learning styles and abilities of the individual client and offenders in general. Once we attend to measuring risk and needs associated with the chance of recidivism, we are naturally led to inquire about the techniques that can bring about change (Gendreau, 1996). Overall, cognitive-behavioral techniques are the most conducive to offender rehabilitation (Cullen, 2002). Quality probation and parole officers will match offenders not only to program intensity by their level of assessed risk, and not only to the rehabilitative interventions aimed at altering their criminogenic needs, but also to those services and supervisors that are most likely to produce modifications for that individual offender (Gendreau, 1996; Latessa, 1999; Smith, Gendreau, & Swartz, 2009). When possible, responsivity should be taken under consideration in the development of community corrections programs; if nothing else, referrals to services and treatments must be highly individualized, as a one-size-fits-all approach is bound to be ineffective (Cullen & Gendreau, 2000; Latessa & Holsinger, 1998). Identifying barriers to desistance can be achieved through thoughtful assessments, and referrals must be based upon the information gained therein (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Van Voorhis et al., 2009; Ward, Melsner, & Yates, 2007).

Again, existing community supervision practices leave much to be desired in the address of offender responsivity. Sadly, the majority of probation and parole programs do not adequately assess the strengths and weaknesses of offenders that may facilitate or hamper prosocial change, they do not use effective treatment models, and staff are not trained in evidence-based behavioral strategies (Matthews et al., 2001). Too often, a blanket approach to offender treatment is considered acceptable, with little thought provided to whether the service or program is conducive to the offender's personality or capabilities (DeMichele, 2007). Further, as offender motivation is a responsivity variable in correctional treatment (McMurrin, 2009), probation and parole cases must be attentively allocated to thoughtfully matched officers as opposed to undirected caseload assignment (Bonta et al., 2000; Taxman & Thanner, 2006). Given the incredible diversity observed in offender populations, it is foolish to assume that a generic one-size-fits-all approach would be adequate. Simply, for treatment to be effective, it must be tailored to the offender, considering temperament, learning style, motivation, culture, and demographics (Clawson & Guevara, 2011; Harper & Chitty, 2005). There are a number of principles that should be consistently used with offenders, because research repeatedly demonstrates that they are effective; that said, each offender is different, and the intervention must be

reflective of those individual characteristics. Unfortunately, very rarely do probation and parole offices customize an offender's case plan so that it takes into account risk, need, or responsivity considerations (Taxman, Yancey, & Bilanin, 2006).

Finally, there are a host of other guidelines that when used in conjunction with the risk, need, and responsivity principles, produce dramatic reductions in recidivism. Primary examples include knowledgeable and accountable staff, the use of community aftercare, multimodal interventions, enhancing motivation for change, firm but fair program contingencies, interpersonally sensitive and constructive relations, and advocacy (Andrews & Bonta, 2010; Cullen, & Gendreau, 2000; Gendreau et al., 1994; MacKenzie, 2006; Taxman, 1999). Perhaps most important, quality probation and parole programs embody the principles of core correctional practice: anti-criminal modeling, effective reinforcement and disapproval, problem-solving techniques, structured learning procedures for skill-building, effective use of authority, cognitive self-change, relationship practice, and motivational interviewing (Clawson & Guevara, 2011; Gendreau, Smith, & French, 2006). Of this litany of best practices, many can be achieved through the development of a multifaceted intervention built on a sound conceptual model, followed by quality implementation and periodic evaluation and adjustment (Antonowicz & Ross, 1994; Latessa & Lowenkamp, 2006; Lipsey, 2009).

Not surprisingly, the majority of these supplemental principles are not followed in average probation and parole programs. Therapeutic integrity is often low, and the typical emphasis on case management or law enforcement fails to promote (and sometimes discourages) long-term behavioral change (Taxman, 1999). Standard programs commit many of the same mistakes, producing unsavory outcomes for offenders and their communities (Latessa & Holsinger, 1998; Solomon et al., 2005). Such common shortcomings include atheoretical strategies, using techniques not based on the "what works" research, interventions that are too short or do not occupy a significant percentage of offenders' time with structured programs, poor staff outcomes (high turnover, improper training, poor clinical supervision, no assessment), employing inappropriate performance measures, minimal evaluation, and too few rewards with too many punishers (and these sanctions are used improperly).

Consistently, the clinically relevant and psychologically informed principles of effective intervention yield the strongest reductions in recidivism (Dowden, Antonowicz, & Andrews, 2000). However, probation and parole strategies rarely implement or adhere to these evidence-based best practices due to a number of political and professional barriers (Gendreau, Goggin, & Fulton, 2000). The overwhelming majority of community corrections interventions rely on some form of so-called treatment; these strategies are more appropriately categorized as service brokerage, as they are passive methods of service referral, as opposed to a directive and salient intervention aimed at substantial cognitive and behavioral prosocial change (Solomon et al., 2005; Solomon et al., 2008; Taxman, 1999). Rehabilitation is a necessary ingredient to recidivism reduction. Treatment within probation and parole supervision can be highly effective, though the way it is currently being executed requires substantial redesign.

Why Control Does Not Work

Much like probation and parole programs ignoring best practices in offender treatment, mechanisms of community correctional control are often likewise devoid of research-driven principles of effective intervention. It is important to note that while quality community corrections programs require a strong rehabilitation component, it would be foolish to assume that the inclusion of treatment equates to the exclusion of control. As discussed previously, both approaches are necessary for successful outcomes. Offenders, who have a demonstrable pattern of breaking the law, must be appropriately monitored to ensure that past actions do not all but guarantee similar future actions. Yet without an intervention that addresses the underlying causes of crime, it is unreasonable to believe that offending would cease under the presence of control. In the proceeding section, the reader will note that this balance of responsibilities is generally absent from control-oriented probation and parole strategies. Though they are compatible, there is a misconception that the law enforcement nature of much community corrections work makes offender treatment impossible. However, not only do these surveillance- or punitive-intensive programs fall short due to the omission of a behavioral intervention, but the actual way in which offender control is practiced is misguided.

To begin, effective probation and parole strategies must be based on a clear and valid criminological theory (Latessa, 1999; Latessa & Holsinger, 1998; MacKenzie, 2006; Moore, Gray, Roberts, Taylor, & Merrington, 2006). Whether the aim is early intervention, crime prevention, or crime reduction, it is illogical to anticipate that the desired goal could be met without a solid understanding of why people offend in the first place. Above all, then, accurate criminological theories are necessary. Though appearance should not take precedence over efficacy when enacting policy (Cullen et al., 2009), deterrence theory has often informed criminal justice strategies because of its inherently intuitive appeal (Cullen & Jonson, 2012). Simply, it seems a matter of common sense that offenders make cost-benefit calculations of the outcomes associated with crime. When the estimated rewards are expected to outweigh the perceived risks, they are likely to commit the criminal act under consideration. The key to crime prevention, according to those who ascribe to this theory, is to decrease the benefits of crime while increasing its costs. Rational choice theory underlies related policies, whereby sanction certainty, severity, and celerity (swiftness) ostensibly influence criminal decision making.

Although these ideas sound reasonable on the surface, they suffer from a few key paralyzing shortcomings. Some theorists have suggested that offenders do not have all information available when they make crime-related decisions. Rather, they suggest, people have bounded rationality or willpower that they use to make reasonable decisions given the information at hand (Jacobs & Wright, 2009; Jolls, Sunstein, & Thaler, 1998). However, even when we consider offender decision-making in light of this limited amount of information used in the cost-benefit analysis, it is clear that offenders often still behave irrationally (particularly if under the influence of an intoxicant, if suffering from a mental illness, or if judgment is clouded by

extreme emotions). Manipulating the expected utility of crime may therefore be in vain. That the effect of punishment on re-offending is contingent upon numerous factors (beyond the two that rational choice theory would ascribe; Sherman, 1993) demonstrates the need for a more dynamic correctional philosophy, reflective of the individual differences between offenders (Cullen & Jonson, 2012).

Further, although the contributions of deterrence theory in its classical form ought not to be discounted, our ability to pragmatically or ethically apply it is questionable (Cullen, Pratt, et al., 2002). Principally, the criminal justice system cannot feasibly ensure that all crimes will elicit detection, prosecution, and punishment. As the contingency of sanctions upon offending weakens, crime statistically involves less risk. Next, for humanitarian purposes, the severity of punishments cannot be exercised far beyond current practices. Finally, constitutional rights afforded to offenders guarantee due process, thereby diminishing the swiftness with which sanctions are paired with crimes. Given the divergence between theory and application, an appreciable or consistent deterrent effect may not be possible. Because we cannot easily make certain criminal justice punishments any more certain, severe, or swift, we should rethink whether (or how) deterrence ought to guide offender supervision. This is especially evident when criminal justice policies are aimed at increasing the costs associated with crime rather than enhancing the rewards associated with conformity (Cullen, Pratt, et al., 2002). As they are frequently applied, control-oriented sanctions have had little influence in encouraging desistance, and have often worked in the opposite direction toward promoting recidivism (Taxman, 1999).

Yet this has not discouraged deterrence theory allegiants. How could an ineffective class of strategies become so popular? With the dust settling from the “nothing works” hysteria (Martinson, 1974), America required a new penal philosophy. A “crisis in corrections” was occurring, where two unrelenting forces demanded a new direction: an exponential increase in the prison population and the rising costs associated with the imprisonment binge. As with the attack on rehabilitation, both political parties advocated dramatic change (Cullen & Gilbert, 2013; Cullen & Jonson, 2012). Conservatives wanted to save money while not sacrificing punishment, and liberals sponsored community corrections as a lesser evil than prison (Cullen & Jonson, 2012; Cullen et al., 1996). The product was a host of *intermediate* punishments. Despite being founded on ideals of offender assistance and service brokerage, probation and parole quickly became synonymous with the micromanaging of offenders (Lindner, 1994). Community control programs (including intensive supervision, electronic monitoring and home confinement, drug testing, and boot camps or shock incarceration) were campaigned as commonsensical (Cullen et al., 2005), falling along the continuum of sanction severity between prison and standard, uninvolved probation (Morris & Tonry, 1990). These sanctions were intertwined with deterrence theory, suggesting that an increase in monitoring and control, combined with the threat of imprisonment for failure to comply, would decrease re-offending. Increased foresight would have prompted the realization that expenditures and offender harm would be spared only if probationers and parolees were actually deterred; yet, emotionality and “common sense” were allowed to reign over logic and evidence.

For this reason, it is difficult to determine whether the movement toward intermediate sanctions was purely symbolic. When analyzing the substantive contributions of community control programs, several research dilemmas make conclusive evidence rare (Cullen et al., 1996). First, evaluation studies rarely have experimental designs, making selection biases probable. Next, there are outcome measures beyond bottom-line recidivism that may support the efficacy of a program, though these are frequently ignored. Finally, unsupportive results could be due to a lack of program integrity rather than a poorly specified logic model, given that researchers rarely measure what occurs inside the “black box” in their evaluations. Above all, however, assessments indicate that an increase in control does not translate into lower recidivism rates. When the methodological uncertainties in these evaluations are addressed, the results remain unsupportive of a deterrent effect of control-centered offender supervision (MacKenzie, 2000). In one particularly rigorous study, Petersilia and Turner (1993) concluded that an increase in surveillance did not diminish the frequency or severity of additional offenses among community corrections populations. As a result of intensive supervision, however, technical violations increased dramatically, often leading to revocation. Therefore, it seems that community control programs fail to resolve prison crowding, address fiscal concerns, or promote justice while preventing crime.

In the rare, successful offender control programs, the reduction in re-offending is attributable to the treatment-orientation of the sanction, rather than to the deterrence components (Cullen & Jonson, 2012). Control-intensive offender supervision has the prospect of efficacy, but this is only if probation and parole programs incentivized conformity as opposed to punishing deviance. Frankly, an individual’s criminogenic risks do not remain at bay simply because the threat of punishment looms. Indeed, deterrence measures are among the *weakest* predictors of crime (Pratt & Cullen, 2005). If nothing else, the rationale—that if you watch offenders more closely you will observe them violating their supervision or breaking the law more often—is hard to deny. Offenders report that control-oriented programs are the most severe sanctions, not because of the decreased benefits of crime and the increased costs of crime, but because of the inconveniences resulting from having freedoms restricted (May & Wood, 2010). In fact, evidence indicates that offenders are more greatly deterred by informal social control (such as the pressure from family or the desire to keep a job) than by threats of severe, formal punishment (Piquero, 2003). Offenders are also more likely to comply with deterrent strategies when justifications for the supervision conditions are provided (Wood & Kemshall, 2007). Especially when the level of control is indiscriminately applied, regardless of the risk level of offenders, the results will be unbecoming (Carter, 2003; Gendreau et al., 1994). With all of these considerations in mind, the conclusion is stark: “For offenders who are already in the correctional system, there is just not much evidence that trying to punish them makes them less criminogenic” (Cullen & Jonson, 2012, p. 89).

As correctional populations have continued to climb, and the country’s political culture has led to an unprecedented tough-on-crime movement, deterrence theory has lost face validity (Gibbons, 2000). Proponents argue that manipulating

the environment so that the likelihood of detection is increased and pain is maximized will inhibit recidivism. This is all well and good: We demand that justice (retribution) be enacted for wrongdoing, and hopefully harsh punishments will protect public safety as crimes are prevented (deterrence). Yet while we like to apportion crime to personal responsibility (and offenders do have some degree of control over their destinies), probation and parole outcomes *are* shaped by community corrections strategies (MacKenzie, 2006; McCleary, 1978; Moore et al., 2006). Unfortunately, these control- or punishment-oriented philosophies promote re-offending, with harsher sentences and more scrupulous surveillance diminishing the likelihood of deterrence (MacKenzie, 2000; Pearson & Lipton, 1999; Solomon et al., 2005). Deterrence theory as it is currently applied as a probation and parole strategy is highly ineffective at reducing crime (Taxman, 1999). We require a new way of doing business, in which the goal of internal control (i.e., changing offenders' thought processes so that crime opportunities are avoided and resisted) supersedes the external pressure of punishment (Gendreau et al., 1994; Wood & Kemshall, 2007; Zimring & Hawkins, 1995). For community supervision to be effective, there must be a shift in collective thought. We must move away from the goal of trying to control offenders toward viewing probation and parole as a precise intervention of which control is a necessary component (Burke, 2004; Dickey & Klingele, 2004; Fulton, Stichman, Travis, & Latessa, 1997).

Conclusion: A New Paradigm for Offender Supervision

Despite these fairly consistent findings of what is known to work and what repeatedly fails, ineffective community corrections practices abound (Lipsey, 2009). In fact, offender supervision programs that have proven to be harmful have prospered (Cullen et al., 2009). If nothing else, there is an ambivalence between offender care and control (Worrall & Hoy, 2005). Historical momentum, political popularity, and the alleged rationality of traditional probation and parole strategies have produced "a socially constructed reality that is resistant to falsification" (Cullen et al., 2005, p. 55). Boot camps and intensive supervision are prime evidence that officials rarely incorporate evidence-based criteria into their decision making (Cullen et al., 2005; Cullen et al., 1996). Rather than investing correctional policy in common sense or political popularity (Cullen, Fisher, & Applegate, 2000), future efforts should seek to reverse the known conditions of crime causation (Engel & Atkinson, 2010).

This realization led to a proposed *environmental corrections*, in which probation and parole officers would aim to reduce offenders' opportunities for crime (Cullen, Eck, & Lowenkamp, 2002). Borrowing from the knowledge generated within environmental criminology, community supervision should seek to disrupt the routine activities that increase opportunities for offending, substituting prosocial, structured activities. These efforts produce the ideal community corrections intervention, in which the control aspects of deterrence would successfully merge with treatment efforts. Additionally, the principles of effective correctional intervention

can be manipulated to complement place-based crime prevention tactics. Effective probation and parole programs must emphasize a *comprehensive* approach to crime control, in which offender accountability is balanced with offender assistance toward gaining prosocial outcomes (Evans, 2001; Fulton, Latessa, Stichman, & Travis, 1997; MacKenzie, 2006). Simply, we require an extensive shift away from risk control and toward risk reduction (Pierce-Danford & Guevara, 2010). This can only be accomplished when the fanatical obsession with surveillance and behavioral control is substituted with behavioral change objectives (Taxman & Byrne, 2001; Taxman, Young, & Byrne, 2003).

As established, current probation and parole operations have been managing an irreconcilable predicament: Community corrections caseloads are rising, but resources are diminishing. This crisis undoubtedly influences the way we assess practices—yet this still misses the heart of the matter: effectiveness. As the research evidence displayed above indicates, it is clear that offenders are not supervised in the best manner possible. This current state of affairs has prompted the realization that “the current practice of community supervision could be improved, perhaps dramatically, by adopting a new paradigm—a new way of thinking—about how best to supervise offenders on probation and parole” (Cullen, Eck, & Lowenkamp, 2002, p. 28). The “incompatible” goals of treatment and control have produced a period of stagnation in community corrections. Although somewhat discouraging, the promise of positive change is great; the lack of a clearly articulated goal provides policy-minded scholars a chance to reinvent offender supervision. Accordingly, in this volume, we propose a modest though unique conceptual framework (with corresponding recommendations for intervention techniques) that may improve existing probation and parole practices.

The main premise of this environmental corrections model of offender supervision is that effective interventions must be based on valid criminological theory and evidence-based best practices. Core insights from environmental criminology are borrowed, exploring the implications of theories and practices of opportunity reduction to probation and parole supervision. As the creators of this framework note, “The key aspect of environmental corrections is not its revolutionary character but its novel use of the insights of environmental criminology to illuminate how correctional supervision can lower recidivism by reducing offenders’ opportunities to offend” (Cullen, Eck, & Lowenkamp, 2002, p. 30). The experiences of practitioners will be integral to the redesign of community corrections. By transforming probation and parole officers into problem solvers, sensitive to the context in which their clients’ crime occurs, a specific intervention that can reasonably reduce recidivism can be developed.

The two ingredients to address for successful crime prevention are propensity and opportunity. As described by the principles of effective correctional intervention, re-offending likelihoods can be significantly reduced when certain conditions are met. Specifically, the focus must be on higher risk offenders, the known predictors of recidivism must be targeted for change, and cognitive-behavioral interventions within the context of multimodal programs should be delivered (applying a sufficient dosage of treatment combined with the provision of appropriate aftercare). As was also seen, the

component of opportunity does not, and cannot, work when supervision conditions are premised on general deterrence (vague restrictions and prescriptions), when the amount of (rather than the nature of) supervision is changed, or when crude criminological understandings do not change propensity or restructure offending opportunities. It is the role of probation and parole officers to proactively intervene, determining how best to reduce their clients' access to criminal opportunities.

This reconceptualization of offender supervision will require thorough assessment, involve work with probationers and parolees, the recruitment of agents of informal social control, and the solicitation of community target guardians and place managers. This model emphasizes how "opportunity will be curtailed not only by threats of formal punishment for non-compliance, but more importantly by problem-solving officers who seek to expand informal social control over offenders, to increase the effort offenders must exert to access crime opportunities, and to work with offenders to restructure and fill their lives with prosocial routines" (Cullen, Eck, & Lowenkamp, 2002, p. 35). Practically, this new method of offender supervision identifies crime prevention options in the here and now, emphasizes the factors proximate and integral to offending, and ultimately identifies those elements amenable to manipulation. The following chapter explores in great detail precisely what environmental corrections is, describing how situational crime prevention and opportunity reduction can contribute to successful probation and parole outcomes.