

Eight Fallacies About Crime

Understanding crime requires controlling our emotions. We are all angered when we learn of suffering crime victims, people wrongly convicted of crimes, or people who destroy their own lives or those of others. But we cannot let our natural emotions prevent us from examining all the facts and thinking clearly about crime.

If you can learn how to think clearly about crime, you can become an effective crime analyst. That can lead to a job working with police or private companies, but it can also make you a better citizen. This book will help you overcome illusions about crime and think clearly about how to reduce it.

I have developed the routine activity approach as a rather simple theory to help you study crime without getting lost. It is very practical for policy, too, for it treats the criminal act as a *tangible* event occurring within the physical world. The routine activity approach focuses on exactly *how*, *when*, and *where* crime occurs.

In this book I use this approach and hope to teach you something about crime you do not know already. First, I ask you, as the reader, to overcome these eight fallacies about crime:

1. Dramatic fallacy
2. Cops-and-courts fallacy
3. Not-me fallacy
4. Innocent-youth fallacy
5. Ingenuity fallacy
6. Formally organized crime fallacy
7. Big gang fallacy
8. Agenda fallacy

These fallacies keep coming back again and again via the media and in unusual stories people tell, which misrepresent what *normally* happens with crime.

Mistaken images affect people and what they expect from police. A Chicago home is burgled. The owner calls police, expecting them to show up with a crime scene team and to go find the burglar. Yet police in a big city might not show up at all for an ordinary burglary! If the victim demands a full investigation, the officer might declare, “Lady, you’ve been watching too much television.” On television, big crimes have big investigations, but that does not represent real life. Police simply lack the resources to send a crime-scene investigation team to catch an ordinary burglar.

This book is about crime as it really happens. My challenge to you is not only to learn these fallacies, but to fortify yourself with them and withstand the daily bombardment of dramatic misinformation about crime.

The Dramatic Fallacy

Note that I call my theory “the routine activity approach.” I work very hard to avoid being distracted by dramatic crimes. One semester, a student came to me before the first class and asked, “Is this about serial murderers?” and I told her no—this class will emphasize ordinary thefts and fights. She dropped the course. Are you willing to learn about most crime as it really occurs?

Even in the era with only three television networks, dramatic crimes got more attention and made a better story as television stations tried to keep their ratings high. Today’s media are even more interested in shootouts between felons and police officers, murders by drug dealers or jealous lovers, or in extreme or clever offenders.

Yet most criminal acts are not very clever or romantic. The *dramatic fallacy* states that the most publicized offenses are very distant from real life. The media are carried away by a *horror-distortion sequence*. They find a horror story and then entertain the public with it. They make money on it, while creating a myth in the public mind. Then they build on that myth for the next horror story. Thus, crime becomes very distorted in the public mind.¹

These distortions can produce a “moral panic” as stories accumulate and make people increasingly scared—even though the incidents in question are exceedingly rare. I am not denying that horrible incidents occur and that those nearby suffer greatly. But millions of people at great distance suffer vicariously via the news reports, forgetting that their greatest local horrors are likely to come from ordinary car accidents, heart attacks, and strokes that don’t even get in the news.

No crime is more distorted in the public eye than murder. The most interesting or elaborate murders are publicized. Much of the public responds as if murder is the most common crime. Let’s consider the reality based on the Uniform Crime Report for 2016 offenses as shown in Exhibit 1.1.²

EXHIBIT 1.1 Murder Is a Tiny Part of the Crime Volume

Offense Committed	Number of Offenses in 2016
Murder plus nonnegligent manslaughter	17,250
Total major violent crimes	1,248,185
Total major property crimes	7,919,035
Miscellaneous other crimes in police records	millions
Other crimes not leading to arrest	tens of millions

Source: Created from FBI Uniform Crime Reports 2016: Crime in the U.S., Table 1.

A simple calculation shows that major violent crimes outnumber the murder category 70 to 1. Total major property crimes outnumber murder by a ratio of about 460 to 1. The millions and millions of other crimes outnumber murder by perhaps 10,000 to 1. Clearly, the media emphasis on murder is misplaced.

Fictitious television detectives would have no interest whatsoever in most of these 17,250 murders in 2016. Only 11 people were poisoned, among the murder victims we have information about. Only 1 died of explosives. Some 114 were killed with narcotics, 9 drowned, and 98 were strangled. About 11,000 died of gunshots, but most of the guns were handguns, not assault weapons.³

Most murders are the tragic result of a stupid little quarrel. Indeed, murder is less a crime than it is an outcome. The path toward murder is not much different from that of an ordinary fight, except that, unfortunately, someone happened to die. Murder has two central features: a gun too near and a hospital too far. My brother, Richard Felson, has written by far the best work explaining how violence emerges from simple disputes.⁴ Although some murderers intend to kill from the outset, even they usually have simple reasons not worth televising.

Despite these dramatic exceptions, most quarrels do not lead to threats. Most threats do not lead to blows. Most blows produce minor physical harm. Most physical harm requires no hospitalization. Most hospitalization is brief, and only rarely does it lead to death. For local police departments, disturbance calls far exceed in number the actual assaults requiring an arrest, and even these assaults may involve no physical injury whatsoever.

Of course, we would like a society in which nobody gets mad at anybody else. But we should not interpret murder as our indicator of the larger picture. I am repeatedly shocked that observers would use homicide statistics to measure overall crime.

The dominance of minor problems is repeatedly verified by statistics. Property-crime victimizations far exceed violent victimizations. The simplest thefts and burglaries are the most common offenses and far exceed major thefts of large amounts. Self-report surveys pick up a lot of illegal consumption

and minor offenses, but little major crime. High school students admit to considerable underage drinking, minor theft, and plenty of marijuana experimentation; only a small percentage report using cocaine or hard drugs.⁵

Occasional usage far exceeds regular usage.⁶ These drugs do much less overall harm than simple alcohol abuse—always the greatest American drug problem. Misunderstanding the problem causes the public and its representatives to pick the wrong policies.

You can see, then, that most offenses are not dramatic. As noted earlier, most violent crimes are relatively infrequent and leave little long-term physical harm (although physical attacks can definitely leave emotional scars). When injury does result, it is usually self-containing and not classified as aggravated assault, much less homicide. Everyday crime is usually not much of a story: Someone drinks too much and sometimes gets into a fight. There is no inner conflict, thrilling car chase, or life-and-death struggle. He saw, he took, and he left. He won't give it back.

Of course, dramatic events sometimes occur in real life. By the time this book is in your hands, another intruder may shoot up a school, and people will then talk about that one event as if it represented all crime. Keep your focus on the plain facts of crime, and ignore the dramatic event of the month.

The Cops-and-Courts Fallacy

Many of my students are in law enforcement, and I appreciate their role. But they are not the center of the crime universe. Police, courts, and prisons are important *after* crimes have entered the public sphere, but they are not the key actors in crime production or prevention. Crime comes *first*, and the justice system *sometimes* finds out and acts upon it. The *cops-and-courts fallacy* warns us against overrating the power of criminal justice agencies, including police, prosecutors, and courts.

Police Work

Real police work is by and large mundane. Ordinary police activity includes driving around a lot, asking people to quiet down, hearing complaints about barking dogs, filling out paperwork, meeting with other police officers, and waiting to be called up in court. If you ever become a crime analyst, you will quickly learn that

- Many calls for service never lead to a real crime report.
- Many complaints (e.g., barking dogs) bother a few citizens, but do not directly threaten the whole community.
- Many problems are resolved informally, as they should be.

The old line is that “Police work consists of hour upon hour of boredom, occasionally interrupted by moments of sheer terror.” But most officers don’t experience or deliver that much terror. Of 600,000 law enforcement officers in the United States, 90 percent never experienced any assault during the year 2016. Of those assaulted, about 1 in 4 was injured, but only 66 died from attack by felons—a few more than the number dying by accident.⁷ These deaths are very upsetting to other officers and the public. However, the annual risk of dying on duty is only 0.000113—about 11 per 100,000 officers. Such deaths make good television because they are so dramatic, but the public does not realize how rare they really are.

A few hundred civilians per year are shot dead by law enforcement personnel. Some police officers wait years for moments like those seen on TV. Most officers seldom—or never—take a gun out of its holster. Most are never shot at and never shoot at anybody else. Only a tiny portion of homicides in the United States are at the hands of police. So, what’s really happening?

Police are society’s agents of daily confrontation. Drunks on the street? Barking dogs? Loud parties at night? Teens hanging around? Couple arguing? Call the cops. Their job is to close down the beer keg just when the party is getting good.

In these encounters, rude behavior can go in many directions: civilians toward civilians; civilians toward cops; cops toward civilians. Police see a lot of rude behavior and hear a lot of rude language, some of it directed at them. Most rudeness does not escalate. But sometimes it does. Police use of force usually amounts to a bit of a shove, or moving the arms behind the back when cuffing someone. Sometimes an offender shoves back, but knives and guns are exceptional in most cities for most police.

To understand policing, understand that most crimes are not reported to the police in the first place. As I noted, police are called more often to deal with barking dogs and loud parties than they are asked to stop a major felony. They handle most events informally with no violence and no arrests.

Police do not even *know* about most crimes that occur during the year. In the 2016 National Crime Victim Survey, only 42 percent of those who said they were victimized by violence also said they had reported the crime to the police.⁸ Self-report studies cited earlier in this chapter turn up even greater numbers of illegal acts that never are reported to police, notably many millions of instances of marijuana consumption, underage alcohol use, shoplifting, private assaults, and billions of dollars’ worth of fraud that businesses and citizens leave unreported.

Average citizens often demand more “police presence” in their neighborhood. But they really don’t understand their own situation. The *theory* is that police can reduce crime by patrolling—inhibiting wrongdoing by their sheer presence on the streets. The Kansas City Patrol Experiment investigated this point. The experiment discovered that intensified police patrols

are *scarcely noticed* by offenders or citizens and have no impact on crime rates.⁹ More recent work finds that police can reduce crime, but only if they concentrate police efforts very intelligently.¹⁰ Given 300 million people and billions of valuable items dispersed over vast space, there is no practical way for police to deliver blanket protection. Like all of us, the police have to focus their efforts to become more effective.

I live in Austin, Texas, which has 2,600 sworn officers attempting to control crime for

- 963,000 residential population,
- spread over more than 350,000 housing units, and
- approximately 300 square miles of land.

Perfect 24-hour coverage of every housing unit would require at least 350,000 multiplied by 24 hours, or 8.4 million person-hours of work. That means that each officer would have to work over 3,200 hours a day! This explains why mass police protection is simply not possible.

Do you really expect police to know that the guy that just left your house is a burglar? Most burglaries proceed with nobody getting caught, but when somebody is caught, it is not because the police are on the spot. Less than 1 percent of burglaries end with the offender apprehended in the act by an officer on patrol. Doubling the number of police in a US city is doubling a drop in the bucket.

Courts and Punishment


For most crimes known to the police, nobody gets arrested. When there is an arrest, most cases are never sent to the prosecutor. Of the cases that go up, most lead to plea bargaining between attorney and prosecutor, not a trial. Of those that go to trial, bench trials in a local police court are much more likely than a full-blown jury trial, as seen on TV. Even people convicted are very likely to avoid incarceration, despite several decades of “law and order” politics. For example, some 3.3 million household burglaries were estimated in the United States in 2016.¹¹ Of these, about half of the incidents were reported to the police. About 1 in 10 resulted in arrests. We estimate that only about 1 percent of burglaries lead to a conviction, and fewer still to incarceration. The chance of being punished for a drug offense is much smaller, still.

It is a mistake to think that courts in the United States are mainly devoted to processing criminal cases. As Exhibit 1.2 indicates, over half of court cases involve traffic violations. Only about 1 in 5 are criminal cases, many of which deal with misdemeanors.

Within the court setting, very few convictions are based on trials like the ones you see on TV. Most are plea-bargained in meetings between prosecutor

EXHIBIT 1.2

Distribution of Cases Among Trial Courts in the United States, 2016



Source: Created using data from the Court Statistics Project.

and defense attorney, and only about 1 in 50 cases go before a jury. When the criminal justice system delivers punishment, it does so after long delays, typically 6 to 8 months. A defendant has a better chance to be released with case dismissed than to be tried and acquitted. Canadian data also show that the defendant's best chance is to avoid and delay, hoping the system will get tired of him and send him on his way.¹²

That delay is very important for crime policy. People expect far too much deterrence to result from punishment by the justice system. Psychologists have found that the best way to get someone to do what you want is to reward more than you punish, doing so quickly, often, and mildly. The US criminal justice system does everything wrong:

- It punishes bad rather than rewarding good.
- It penalizes people rarely and sporadically.
- It delivers its decisions and penalties after long delays.

People inside the justice system often find this very frustrating, so when they can finally convict someone, they often want to “throw the book” at him. However, extreme penalties delivered late and sporadically have little practical impact. And, remember, they can only be delivered when a crime is known and after an arrest is made.

In contrast, crime itself offers sure and quick rewards to offenders. Don't be surprised that many people continue to commit crimes.

Consider what happens when you touch a hot stove: The pain you receive is quick, certain, sharp, but usually not long lasting. After being burned once, you will not touch a hot stove again. Now think of an imaginary hot stove that burns you only once every 500 times you touch it, with the burn not hurting until 6 months later. The other 499 times you receive a quick reward. Psychological research and common sense alike tell us a justice system will not work very well if it follows this principle.

My point is not to blame the people in the criminal justice system. They are subject to practical limits just like everyone else. Keep in mind justice system realities, and don't expect too much from the clean-up squad.

The Not-Me Fallacy

Attribution is an important principle in social psychology. People tend to forgive their own misdeeds, but not the misdeeds of strangers. They tend to explain away their own misdeeds as situational: "I drank too much at the party because my friends were there." "I had no other way to get home but to drive, and I only had a few drinks." "I wasn't really going that fast considering that there was no traffic." "I didn't have time to find a condom."

On the other hand, people tend to be harsher and more personal in explaining the misdeeds of strangers: "That guy's irresponsible." "Good girls don't do that." "What do you expect of people who live on that side of town?" Note the contradiction: The same deeds are excused for me and my people, even though I blame outsiders for doing the very same thing.

The not-me fallacy is the tendency to think that crime does not apply to me or people in my world, but rather to outsiders. It is consistent with attribution theory, explaining why hypocrisy is so common when people discuss crime.

People tend to hold others, especially strangers, to higher standards than they hold themselves. It is perfectly normal to deny one's own bad deeds or to find situational alibis. People are less charitable to those they don't know or don't like. Attribution theory helps us understand why people can participate in crime without labelling themselves as criminals. Even though white Americans consume illegal drugs as much as members of minority groups, whites attribute drug abuse mainly to Americans with darker skin. As juveniles get older and break more rules, they begin to recode their infractions as "minor," to becoming more accepting of their own rule-breaking and that of their friends. Even adults find ways to justify crimes in their own areas, while disparaging the other side of the tracks.

The old cowboy movies had good guys (in white hats with white horses) and bad guys (in black hats with black horses). Indeed, empirical research has virtually destroyed the claim that victims and offenders come from separate populations. You don't have to be bad to do bad.

If you follow society's rules most of the time, you can conveniently forget your own exceptions. If you commit a few crimes, you can remind yourself of the many you have not committed. If you skip a temptation out of fear, you can persuade yourself that you are morally superior to somebody else.

Or perhaps you never had a chance to break a rule. Researchers learned that women's lack of sexual experience early in the 20th century reflected mainly the fact that nobody ever tried.¹³ Young women were closely watched by parents and could not easily be alone with a young man. But the vast majority of those women who gained that opportunity proceeded with sexual explorations natural to the species.

Once you know the not-me fallacy, you should remember that active offenders are not that different from the rest of the population. Not only is some offending normal, but offenders themselves have extremely high rates of victimization.¹⁴ Thus, offenders are often victimized by other offenders, while many victims are really not entirely innocent.

Most people violate at least some laws sometimes. That's why it is so misleading to use such terms as "the bad guys," "the super-predators," or "criminal man." Although overactive offenders exist, they are only part of the picture. Nor is the motivation for crime exclusive, since we all have reasons to be tempted.

In 1943, Porterfield gave the same self-report survey designed for the local juvenile delinquents to his own students at Texas Christian University. He learned that the two groups had rather similar delinquency levels.¹⁵ That finding has been strengthened by many self-report studies over many decades. It hardly makes sense to divide the world into good guys and bad guys.

Even more extreme are the studies of sexual fantasies and daydreaming. Several researchers have given the same fantasy questionnaire to sex offenders and college students. Common and frequent fantasies among college students include having sex in public places, sadomasochism, forbidden partners, group sex, and a variety of illegal behaviors.¹⁶ A human population appears to contain much greater potential for sexual rule-breaking than sex-offending data indicate.

In sum, the general public tends to attribute criminal personalities and tendencies to outsiders, while fancying themselves as above the fray. Their own infractions are recorded in their minds as situational responses or exceptional behaviors. This allows them to divide the world into good guys and bad guys, while assigning themselves, their family, and friends to the first group.

The Innocent-Youth Fallacy

The television version of crime often portrays middle-aged offenders. When the young are there, they are usually presented as innocents corrupted by

those who are older. This reflects the *innocent-youth fallacy*, the belief that being young means being innocent.

Are young people really that innocent? Do they really need to be corrupted by adults, or by a foul environment? I have my doubts.

Criminal behavior accelerates quickly in teenage years, peaks in the late teens or early 20s, and declines as youth fades. This has been found in many different datasets, various nations, and numerous eras for which data are available.¹⁷ How could youths be innocent when their relative level of crime participation is so high?

The notion of pre-adolescent innocence is just plain wrong. Mischief and mistreatment begins well before the teenage crime period. A vast literature indicates early aggression by normal children.¹⁸ That aggression includes pushing, shoving, and hitting, but also a variety of overt nonviolent attacks. Researchers have used all kinds of clever devices, including cameras and audio transmitters on playgrounds and during classroom breaks—when teachers were out of sight.

Early childhood includes personal rejections of others (“I’m not your friend.”). Young kids also threaten to exclude others from playgroups or parties. Middle childhood is a bit more sophisticated, spreading rumors, using gossip, backbiting, breaking confidences, criticizing clothes, silent treatment, and various forms of ostracism, bullying, public abuse, or malicious practical jokes.

Omission from official statistics does not prove that bad behavior was absent at earlier years. Legal systems declare young children to be incapable of official crime. Misbehaving children are often handled *informally*. Bad behavior before puberty is usually addressed by teachers and parents behind the scenes, avoiding police involvement. Six-year-olds don’t usually have the muscles to do as much harm, and their teachers and parents are usually bigger and stronger.

With puberty comes greater size and muscularity, along with sexual capacities. Society can no longer treat misbehaviors entirely on an informal basis, and problems begin to spill into the public sphere.

Misbehavior begins to enter our statistical flow during adolescence. Teenage years bring much more rule-breaking than earlier years, while also making that behavior more consequential. That forces the adult world to do something.

It is a mistake to think that youths are most often corrupted by bad adults. Indeed, most youths are corrupted by other youths. For over 100 years, the co-offending literature made it clear that delinquency is largely carried out by small groups, usually very close in age.¹⁹ The corruption process is not just a question of a few bad apples or instigators. Rather, it is a process in which youths together have mutual bad influence.

Strangely enough, the innocent-youth fallacy persists after offenders are convicted and imprisoned. It is often said that prisons should keep young offenders separate, or else the hard-bitten criminals will be a bad influence

on them. But young inmates already know how to commit crime, or they would not be there. In addition, younger inmates cause the most trouble inside the prisons. Officials separate prisoners by age to protect older prisoners from young thugs—not the other way around.

Juvenile homes are also settings for very serious internal offending, such as frequent assaults by those in their early or mid-teens. Indeed, juvenile homes must keep constant watch to keep the stronger boys aged 12 to 14 from raping the weaker boys, or even the counselors. The public is probably not aware of that risk or that it is dangerous to cut personnel supervising to these facilities.

Offender appearances can be quite confusing. Early criminologists thought that offenders look different from nonoffenders—something we now know is false. However, offenders with more innocent faces might escape attention. White offenders might draw less suspicion than those from minority groups. Those living a dangerous lifestyle might age faster, looking quite a few years older than they really are. So, look beneath appearances and imagery to gain a full understanding of crime.

The Ingenuity Fallacy

Everybody loves a hero. To have a hero you also need a villain. The ideal villain is not only bad but also highly competent at villainy—crafty, tough, and resourceful. He must be able to adjust to new situations with creativity and skill. Consider Professor Moriarty, the evil and ingenious criminal in an epic struggle with Sherlock Holmes. It would hardly be fair to send the brilliant Holmes chasing after a drunken fool.

Our ideas about classic criminals also include the skilled cat burglar who can slip into a third-story room of sleeping victims, quietly pocket valuables, then glide down the drainpipe with nary a worry of excess gravity. Edwin Sutherland chronicled his interviews with Chick Conwell in *The Professional Thief, by a Professional Thief*.²⁰ This offender knew how to switch fake jewels for real ones right in front of the store owner and had the skill to trick people out of their money, to pick pockets, and to crack safes. The ingenuity fallacy is the tendency to assume that many or most offenders are highly skilled.

Yet most crime is all too simple, requiring no advanced skills. Lightweight durables are easy to steal. Empty homes with flimsy locks and neighbors away are easy to break into. It is hardly worth the trouble to crack a safe—not only are today's safes much better, but almost nobody knows how to break into them. The Internet and online shopping make theft of credit card numbers easier and more lucrative. Most credit card thieves are on the lower end of the scale of sophistication.

Embarrassed victims don't want to admit how foolish they were or how easily they were victimized. It's common to tell others a *professional* criminal

broke into my house. People who hide the jewels in the cookie jar or the money in the bathroom think that nobody else ever thought of that. Remember that the burglar's mother uses these hiding places, too. If you were looking for someone else's valuables, where would you look?

Most crimes only take a tiny slice of time to commit. Thefts may take 10 seconds or less. An open garage invites a 30-second offense. A burglary needs a minute or two. He makes a mess rummaging quickly, then leaves with some money or jewelry. Robbery also is a quick crime. If someone points a gun at you and asks, "Your money or your life?" how long does it take you to decide? An offender can easily figure out how to get others to comply with his wishes. That's why most crimes involve so little planning, plotting, or creativity (see Chapter 3).

The Formally Organized Crime Fallacy

Max Weber described the process of formal organization and rationality on which modern societies are built.²¹ A formal organization has written rules, communications, and records. Its employees have official job duties, for which they are trained and recruited. It follows clear and formal patterns of promotion. A formal organization has a definite division of labor and hierarchy, with assignments flowing downward and accountability upward.

Most important, formal organizations stipulate *impersonal* relationships among employees and between employees and customers. That means that every customer gets the same-sized ice cream cone. Every student faces the same rules in seeking financial aid from the university. Everybody has a right to apply for a job opening and to be considered seriously. Even if these rules are sometimes violated, they are the normal operating procedure in business, government, and universities for a modern society.

Do crime organizations fit this model of a formal organization? On television and in the movies, *fictional* crime organizations have official rules, formally organized hierarchies, and normal operating procedures. They have regular meetings in wood-paneled rooms, with well-dressed people giving orders down the line. Even their murders seem to be calm and organized.

In North America, most organized crime is far less formal or routine. The whole idea of crime is to *avoid* going to meetings! In real life, criminal enterprises can be very risky. Offenders have the most to fear from one another, but they also have to worry about police. The formal organization model cannot work for most criminal enterprises. For example, those who traffic in valuable illegal drugs face considerable danger. Illicit enterprises cannot buy or sell commodities via a stock exchange, cannot rely on contract protection, or make easy use of the banking system. They have no way to insure their cargo or to resolve disagreements with attorneys or friendly mediators.²²

One solution is to use violence and intimidation. However, a criminal enterprise cannot survive if it is at war within itself on a daily basis. As a result, illicit business requires building trust between criminals—an uneasy process! Adult offenders face problems in finding suitable co-offenders.²³ To accomplish that, organizing crime requires working mostly with long-time friends or family members, with known members of one's own village or neighborhood and one's own social circle or ethnic group, and to stick with the same associates if they have proven reliable. One does not go on the open market in search of co-offenders.

That's why organized criminals cannot work on an impersonal basis. They must be highly personal, picking associates very carefully. Criminal conspiracy is risky, since other offenders can cheat you any time, turn you in to police, and attack or even kill you. And they may decide their share of the loot is greater than you think it should be. In general, ongoing criminal enterprises must minimize the number of co-offenders to avoid betrayal.

They must act quickly to escape detection. Thus, the formal organization model is not likely to work in most cases. That's why criminal cooperation is often at a smaller scale than its televised version. Most criminal conspiracies work like a chain letter. Perhaps Joe grows marijuana and sells some to Mary. She distributes smaller packages among five others, who further break down packages that flow to others in the network.

Each of these packages is handed off very quickly. This illegal network may involve many people, but few of them know each other. If one is arrested, only one or two others might be incriminated. One economic expert in illicit markets shows that drugs and gambling have much simpler organizations than their popular image.²⁴ Don't forget how easy and quick it is to hand someone a package in return for money, to take a bet, or to sell quick sex.

Most crime organization is very rudimentary. A drug supplier meets the person he supplies at McDonald's. Two guys have a drink at a bar and discuss what they need to do later that day. Somebody hides something in the car and crosses the border. A bar owner lets the local prostitutes hang out in return for a kickback. A drivers' license official sells licenses on the side. A purchasing agent buys several thousand desks for the university from the vendor who offers a bribe.

Consider how illegal cigarette smuggling works.²⁵ Although cigarettes are legal commodities, they are smuggled across borders to evade the very high taxes. It is worth it to smugglers, stores, and consumers to trade in untaxed cigarettes. It is easy to find small merchants and street vendors to sell them. Criminal cooperation does not require an elaborate or formal organization.

When the Iron Curtain fell and Europe united, there were improvements in prosperity and human cooperation. The border controls were removed. The bad news is that this opened the door for great increases in organized

crime across Europe. Illegal trafficking grew not only for cigarettes but also for drugs, guns, illegal laborers, and movement of prostitutes across borders. Much of that criminal cooperation occurred in networks—one person to recruit the girls in Poland, another to transport a girl or two into Germany, another to work out what house of prostitution each would work in. Not all members of the network know each other or meet in the same room.

A small human trafficking effort is easier to organize. Somebody might lend his passport once a year to let someone else travel. When several dozen every month are smuggled, a larger ongoing organization is needed.²⁶ Some crime organizations grow larger and get involved in diverse illegal activities.

In an extreme case, organized criminals can take over large segments of society, especially when the central government is extremely weak. Examples are found in Southern Italy and some developing countries. But these more dominant forms of organized crime depend on informal ties and personal trust, even as they become more hierarchical.

The Big Gang Fallacy

Juvenile gangs have a remarkable *image* as cohesive, ruthless, well-organized groups of alienated youths who dominate local crime, do the nation's drug trafficking, provide a surrogate family, and kill anybody who quits. The most famous gangs are often seen as national or even international. The *big gang fallacy* greatly exaggerates the span and role of juvenile gangs.

I treat this fallacy in much greater detail in Chapter 6. But for now, let me raise these questions:

1. Normal teenagers are highly volatile in their social relations. Why would gang members be any less volatile?
2. Why would a normal thief want to divide the loot up with a lot of other people?
3. Do people really like to fight all the time, or to get hurt doing so?

Do not be persuaded by police press releases, or by the televised version of the gang. The leading expert on juvenile gangs, Malcolm W. Klein, started by studying gangs face to face.²⁷ He expected to find coherent groups of boys involved in exciting things. Instead, they were extremely boring most of the time. Klein learned that gangs have very loose structures: people fading in and out, and that gangs often disintegrate. Klein described the street gang as an onion, with each part peeling off to reveal another part, then another, until you got to the core. The few core members were more active than the others (i.e., they hung out regularly, doing next to nothing). Yet most members were peripheral—there one day and not the next. Surprisingly, Klein learned that

social workers *trying* to help boys escape from gangs were *actually keeping the gangs cohesive*. Gangs with no social workers to help them fell apart even more often.²⁸

One of the fascinating features of crime is that so much harm can be done with so little togetherness. A juvenile gang may do evil, but it seldom does *cohesive* evil.

The Agenda Fallacy

The agenda fallacy refers to the fact that many people have an agenda and hope you will assist them. They want you to take advice, vote a certain way, or join their religious group. They may be totally sincere, but still they have plans for you. Their promise, usually bogus, is that their agenda will greatly reduce crime in society.

Moral Agendas

Many people believe that declining morality is the cause of crime. Many parents and leaders think that if you can teach children what's right, then they will simply do it. If they do wrong, that proves you did not teach them the right thing. So, if youths do bad things, they must have bad parents and teachers, or they must have learned bad things from bad peers.

That also means that if you set up a program to teach morality, those in the program will be good from then on. Or if the school has kids pray and promise to be good, they will keep that promise. Very wishful thinking.

Researchers have repeatedly proven this morality argument to be wrong. In 1928, Hartshorne and May taught us that most students can be induced to lie, cheat, or steal.²⁹ This forces us to re-think the idea that the world is clearly divided between good people and bad. Other researchers found that 70 percent of religious school students had cheated on tests, using the same sorts of excuses found in nonreligious schools.³⁰ Studies of cognitive dissonance repeatedly find that moral attitudes do not simply produce moral behavior.³¹ Indeed, prior behaviors can change attitudes as much as attitudes can change behaviors. Many people faced with temptation violate their own moral rules.³² We should not be surprised that hypocrisy is a normal part of human life.

Interestingly, progressing through adolescence leads to more experience with rule-breaking—one's own and one's friends. Several studies find that such experience leads young people to adjust their moral standards downwards. They become more tolerant and forgiving of their friends and themselves, changing their moral expressions to reflect behavior.³³ Indeed, illegal behavior has more influence on conventional beliefs than the other way around.

Moral standards do not guarantee moral behavior, nor does immoral behavior prove a lack of moral training.³⁴ The high murder rate in the United States does not prove that Americans believe in murder or that they are trained to commit murder. If that were the case, why do US laws set such high levels of punishment for murder? Why would US public opinion show such outrage at murderers and other serious criminals?

Consider a parallel question: Why do people become overweight? They don't want to be fat. They aren't trained to be fat. They don't need to be preached at. It would help if they did not live in a nation where rich food is cheap and daily work burns few calories. People sometimes break their own rules.

This is not arguing against trying to instill morality. It's good to teach right from wrong, but you cannot really expect people to follow those rules without being reminded again and again. Each of us knows the rules and that someone might turn us in for breaking them. Morals give Joe a license to watch Peter, and Peter a license to watch Joe. Informal mutual supervision is essential for society to function.

Religious Agendas

Many religious groups feel that conversion to their faith or values will prevent crime and that failure to follow will lead to more crime. Yet some of the most religious regions of the United States have very high crime rates, and the greater US religious observance (compared to Europe) has not given us lower homicide rates. As noted earlier, youths in religious schools were just as likely to lie, cheat, and steal.³⁵

Some studies find correlations between religious activity and avoidance of crime. These correlations can be explained by the demands of sitting quietly through a religious service. Those most inclined to break laws have trouble sitting, so they stop going to church or never even start. Later, perhaps *some* researchers may find a negative correlation between churchgoing and offending. But the inconsistency of the data on that conclusion tells us to look elsewhere. Churchgoing and crime avoidance correlate for an entirely nonreligious reason: the presence of greater self-control.³⁶ Youths who can sit still and do what parents tell them tend to get into less trouble all around.

Yet religious organizations often do a better job of *supervising* people. A close watch on the flock keeps it from straying. Church schools tend to be smaller than public high schools, giving them more effective supervision of youths. They also kick out anybody who behaves too poorly. Smaller church groups can keep close tabs on their flock and thereby remove crime opportunities. Religious groups with quite incompatible beliefs might get somewhere in crime prevention by supervising young people closely. But they have the same problem as everybody else: Turn their heads, and their young flock strays; and even the older flock needs some supervision.

Social and Political Agendas

A wide array of political and social agendas has been linked to crime prevention. If you are concerned about sexual morality, tell people that sexual misbehavior leads to crime. If you are a feminist, proclaim that rape is produced by antifeminism. If you dislike pornography, link it to sexual or other crimes. If the entertainment media offend your sensibilities, blame them for crime and demand censorship as a crime prevention method. If you are in favor of a minimum wage as part of your agenda, then why not argue that it will prevent crime? Right-wing, left-wing, or whatever your agenda, if there is something you oppose, blame that for crime; if there is something you favor, link that to crime prevention. If there is some group you despise, blame them and protect others; this has been called “blame analysis,” and there is a kind of victim industry, publicizing its sufferings in order to make claims on society.³⁷ These are political tactics, not the way to study crime. Many crime reduction claims are far-fetched, even if the proposals are sometimes good.

Welfare-State Agendas

It's very common to assume that crime is part of a larger set of social evils, such as unemployment, poverty, social injustice, or human suffering. That's why some people favor the welfare state, arguing that providing more social programs will reduce crime. Others hate the welfare state and blame it for crime increases.

It is interesting to see partisans on this issue fish for indicators, samples of nations, and periods of history in trying to substantiate their assertions that rising poverty or inequality produce crime. Yet most crime rates went *down* during the Great Depression. We see all the economic indicators rising *with* crime from 1963 to 1975.³⁸ We see the same indicators changing *inversely* to crime in the past few years in the United States.

To recognize that welfare extension (whatever its other merits) cannot reduce crime, take a look at crime rate changes since World War II. Improved welfare and economic changes, especially for the 1960s and 1970s, correlated with more crime! Also, Sweden's crime rates increased 5-fold and robberies 20-fold during the very years (1950 to 1980) when its Social Democratic government was implementing more and more programs to enhance equality and protect the poor.³⁹

Other “welfare states” in Europe (such as the Netherlands) experienced at least as vast increases in crime as the United States, whose poverty is more evident and whose social welfare policies are stingier. Clearly, something was happening in all industrial societies leading to a wave of crime that only recently has leveled off or been reversed.

America's welfare stinginess relative to Europe is often used to explain allegedly higher levels of crime and violence in the United States. It is hard to make international comparisons when laws and police collection methods differ. But we now have a way to solve the problem.

In a major scientific coup, Patricia Mayhew of the British Home Office and Jan van Dijk of the University of Leiden in the Netherlands negotiated a worldwide research effort. Thanks to them, a single crime victimization survey was translated and administered in many different nations. Results of that work are now showing that *the United States does not have higher general crime victimization rates than other developed countries*. Nor is violence higher in the United States! In fact, the 2005 victim surveys found very similar crime victimization rates in 15 industrialized countries, with the United States 12th after Ireland, England and Wales, New Zealand, Iceland, Northern Ireland, Estonia, the Netherlands, Denmark, Mexico, Switzerland, and Belgium.⁴⁰

In these cross-sectional data, the more generous welfare states of Europe, especially in Northern Europe, often have victimization rates similar to the United States. Canada and Australia, which have much more generous welfare systems, have comparable rates. Additional data on robbery, sexual assault, and assault with force show the United States having relatively modest rates of *nonlethal* violence.⁴¹ The view that the United States is the violence capital is further undermined by research showing that school bullying is virtually a universal problem among nations.⁴² British police may carry no guns, but big British kids bully little ones.⁴³

Nonetheless, the United States has much higher *homicide* rates than any developed country of the world. How can we be moderate in general violence but very high in lethal violence? The presence of guns in the United States makes the difference.⁴⁴ Americans are not more violent than Europeans; we just do a better job of finishing people off.

Welfare systems are largely beside the point for crime reduction. This is not an argument against fighting poverty or unemployment. These are valuable goals in their own right, but don't depend on them for security. Crime seems to march to its own drummer, largely ignoring social injustice, inequality, government social policy, welfare systems, poverty, unemployment, and the like. To the extent that crime rates respond at all to these phenomena, they may actually increase with prosperity because there is more to steal. In any case, crime does not simply flow from other ills. As Shakespeare writes,

The web of our life is of a mingled yarn, good and ill together.

—*All's Well That Ends Well*, Act IV, Scene 3

Crime has become a moral, religious, and political football to be kicked around by people with agendas. If you want to learn about crime, you do not have to give up your commitments, but keep them in their proper place. Learn everything you can about crime for learning's sake, not for such ulterior motives as gaining moral leadership, political power, or religious converts. If your political and religious ideas are worthwhile, they should stand on their own merits.

Conclusion

This chapter has given you a good idea of what you have to overcome to understand crime. You have to resist the most dramatic stories about crime. You have to stop thinking about the police and justice system as the center of crime. You should admit to yourself your own rule-breaking and your human potential to do harm. You should resist the verbiage about big gangs and big agendas. Most of all, focus on the crime event.

So many misconceptions have crept into your thinking about crime that you must work to purge them. Statistics are thrown at you that don't paint the entire crime picture. The media keep coming back at you with dramatic examples that miss the point. The police and courts are important, but unrepresentative. Defense mechanisms are strong for denying one's own crime potential. Victims remain in denial about how easily they were outsmarted. Distorted images of crime organization and gangs recur. Ignorant observers link crime to one pestilence after another, or fear the most unlikely events, while forgetting about common risks. Those with axes to grind keep promising that their agendas will stop crime. If you can push aside all of these distractions, you are ready to break down crime into its most basic elements.

MAIN POINTS

- The dramatic fallacy: The media distort crime for their own purposes, creating many of our erroneous conceptions about crime.
- The cops-and-courts fallacy: The importance and influence of police and courts as proactive controls over crime are overstated.
- The not-me fallacy: Crime is committed by everyone, and the “criminal” is not much different from us.
- Innocent-youth fallacy: Being young doesn't mean being innocent.
- The ingenuity fallacy: Most crime is simple, and most criminals are unskilled.
- The formally organized crime fallacy: Criminal conspiracies are attributed much greater organization and sophistication than they actually have.
- The big gang fallacy: The span and role of juvenile gangs has been greatly exaggerated.
- The agenda fallacy: Crime is used haphazardly by a variety of people with moral, religious, social, and political agendas to support their causes.

PROJECTS AND CHALLENGES

Interview project. Interview anyone who works in private security or retail trade. Find out what offenses are common and how they are carried out.

Media project. Take notes of three different nightly news programs. What crimes or crime statistics do they cover and how? What crimes do they fail to cover? How are the crime statistics represented?

Map project. Find an interactive crime-mapping program of a city or police department and create a map of robberies or burglaries for one year. Note how these crimes cluster in space, even on a very local level. (To do this assignment, search online for a city you know or that interests you, then move in on the crime map so you can see variations from block to block. Also try to learn about crime maps at www.nij.gov/topics/technology/maps/Pages/welcome.aspx.⁴⁵)

Photo project. Take five plain photographs indicating that a crime might have been committed at that very location. Discuss what makes you suspect this.

Web project. Find some of the sources mentioned in this chapter, or their updates, via the Internet. Look at a table relevant to this chapter and describe it. Look especially at www.popcenter.org.

ENDNOTES

1. Beckett, K., & Sasson, T. (2004). *The politics of injustice: Crime and punishment in America* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
 2. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2017). *Crime in the United States*. Retrieved from <https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016>. See Table 1.
 3. Ibid. See Expanded Homicide Data Table 4.
 4. Felson, R. B. (2004). A rational choice approach to violence. In M. A. Zahn, H. H. Brownstein, & S. L. Jackson (Eds.), *Violence: From theory to research* (pp. 71–90). London, UK: Routledge.
- Felson, R. B. (2013). What are violent offenders thinking? In B. LeClere & R. Wortley (Eds.), *Cognition and crime: Offender decision making and script analyses*. Crime Science Series. London, UK: Routledge.

5. Miech, R. A., Johnston, L. D., O'Malley, P. M., Bachman, J. G., Schulenberg, J. E., & Patrick, M. E. (2017). *Monitoring the Future national survey results on drug use, 1975–2016: Volume I, Secondary school students*. Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, The University of Michigan. Retrieved from http://monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/mtf-vol1_2016.pdf on February 10, 2018.
6. Johnston, L. D., O'Malley, P. M., Miech, R. A., Bachman, J. G., & Schulenberg, J. E. (2018). *Monitoring the Future national results on adolescent drug use: Overview of key findings, 2017*. Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan. Retrieved from <http://monitoringthefuture.org/pubs/monographs/mtf-overview2017.pdf> on February 10, 2018.
7. Federal Bureau of Investigation. (2017). *Law enforcement officers killed and assaulted, 2016*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office.
8. Morgan, R., & Kena, G. (2017, December). *Criminal victimization, 2016*. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Report NCJ-247648. Retrieved from <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv136.pdf> on January 23, 2018.
9. Kelling, G. L., Pate, T., Dieckman, D., & Brown, C. (1974). *The Kansas City preventive patrol experiment: A summary report*. Washington, DC: Police Foundation.
10. Braga, A. A., Papachristos, A. V., & Hureau, D. M. (2014). The effects of hot spots policing on crime: An updated systematic review and meta-analysis. *Justice Quarterly*, *31*(4), 633–663.

Braga, A. A., & Weisburd, D. L. (2012). The effects of focused deterrence strategies on crime: A systematic review and meta-analysis of the empirical evidence. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, *49*(3), 323–358.

Weisburd, D. L., & Eck, J. (2004). What can police do to reduce crime, disorder and fear? *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *593*, 42–65.
11. Morgan, R., & Kena, G. (2017, December). *Criminal victimization, 2016*. Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Report NCJ-247648. Retrieved from <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv136.pdf> on January 23, 2018.
12. Statistics Canada, Online Table 252-0053, Adult criminal courts, number of cases and charges by type of decision, annual (number). Retrieved from <http://www5.statecan.gc.ca/cansim/a26?lang=eng&id=2520053> on March 4, 2018.
13. Felson, M., & Gottfredson, M. (1984). Adolescent activities near peers and parents. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, *46*, 709–714.
14. Jennings, W. G., Piquero, A. R., & Reingle, J. M. (2012). On the overlap between victimization and offending: A review of the literature. *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, 1716–1726.
15. Porterfield, A. L. (1946). *Youth in trouble*. Fort Worth, TX: Leo Potishman Foundation.
16. Byers, S., Purdon, C., & Clark, D. A. (1998, November). Sexual intrusive thoughts of college students. *Journal of Sex Research*, *35*(4), 359–369.

- Leitenberg, H., & Henning, K. (1995). Sexual fantasy. *Psychological Bulletin*, 117(3), 469–496.
17. Gottfredson, M., & Hirschi, T. (1990). *A general theory of crime*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Hirschi, T., & Gottfredson, M. R. (2000). In defense of self-control. *Theoretical Criminology*, 4(1), 55–69.
- See also: Shulman, E. P., Steinberg, L. D., & Piquero, A. R. (2013). The age-crime curve in adolescence and early adulthood is not due to age differences in economic status. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 42(6), 848–860.
18. Archer, J., & Coyne, S. M. (2005). An integrated review of indirect, relational, and social aggression. *Personality & Social Psychology Review*, 9(3), 212–230.
19. Albert Reiss has a classic review of co-offending behaviors. See Reiss, A. (1988). Co-offending and criminal careers. In N. Morris & M. Tonry (Eds.), *Crime and Justice*, Vol. 10. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
20. Sutherland, E. H. (1933). *The professional thief, by a professional thief*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
21. Weber, M. (1978). *Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Original work published 1922.)
22. Kleemans, E. R. (2012). Organized crime and the visible hand: A theoretical critique on the economic analysis of organized crime. *Criminology and Criminal Justice*, 13(5), 615–629.
- Kleemans, E. R., Soudijn, M.R.J., & Weenink, A. W. (2012). Organized crime, situational crime prevention, and routine activity theory. *Trends in Organized Crime*, 5, 87–92.
23. Tremblay, P. (1993). Searching for suitable co-offenders. In R. V. Clarke & M. Felson (Eds.), *Routine activity and rational choice: Advances in criminological theory* (Vol. 5, pp. 17–36). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
24. Reuter, P. (1998). *The mismeasurement of illegal drug markets* (Report RP-613). Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
25. von Lampe, K. (2011). The illegal cigarette trade. In M. Natarajan (Ed.), *International criminal justice* (pp. 148–154). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
26. Soudijn, M.R.J., & Kleemans, E. R. (2009). Chinese organized crime and situational context: Comparing human smuggling and synthetic drugs trafficking. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 52, 461.
27. Klein, M. W. (1971). *Street gangs and street workers*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
28. Klein's work punctures many preconceptions about gangs: Klein, M. W. (1995). *The American street gang: Its nature, prevalence, and control*. New York:

- Oxford University Press. See also Klein, M. W., Maxson, C. L., & Cunningham, L. C. (1991). "Crack," street gangs, and violence. *Criminology*, 29, 623–650.
29. Hartshorne, H., & May, M. A. (1928). Studies in the nature of character: Vol. 1. *Studies in Deceit*.
 30. Bruggeman, E. L., & Hart, K. J. (1996). Cheating, lying, and moral reasoning by religious and secular high school students. *Journal of Educational Research*, 89(6), 340–344.
 31. Starting with Festinger, L. (1957). *Introduction to a theory of cognitive dissonance*. Evanston, IL: Row Peterson.
 32. Mills, J. (1958). Changes in moral attitudes following temptation. *Journal of Personality*, 26, 517–531.
 33. See: Rebellon, C. J., & Manasse, M. (2007). Tautology, reasoned action, or rationalization? Specifying the nature of the correlation between criminal attitudes and criminal behavior. In K. T. Froeling (Ed.), *Criminology: Research focus* (pp. 257–276). Hauppauge, NY: NOVA Science.
- Engels, R.C.M.E., Luijpers, E., Landsheer, J., & Meeus, W. (2004). A longitudinal study of relations between attitudes and delinquent behavior in adolescents. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 31(2), 244–260.
- Bruggeman, E. L., & Hart, K. J. (1996). Cheating, lying, and moral reasoning by religious and secular high school students. *Journal of Educational Research*, 89(6), 340–344.
34. Wrong, D. H. (1961). The oversocialized conception of man in modern sociology. *American Sociological Review*, 26, 183–193.
 35. Hartshorne, H., & May, M. A. (1928–1930). *Studies in the nature of character*. New York, NY: Macmillan.
 36. Gottfredson, M., & Hirschi, T. (1990). *A general theory of crime*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
 37. Felson, R. B., & Felson, S. (1993, September/October). Predicaments of men and women. *Society*, pp. 2016–2020.
- Best, J. (1999). *Random violence: How we talk about new crimes and new victims*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Felson, R. B. (2014). Gender and the social psychology of aggression. *The Oxford Handbook of Gender, Sex, and Crime*, 77.
38. Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social change and crime rate trends: A routine activity approach. *American Sociological Review*, 44, 588–608.
- Felson, M., & Cohen, L. E. (1981). Modeling crime rate trends—A criminal opportunity perspective. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 18, 138–164 (as corrected, 1982, 19, 1).

39. Dolmen, L. (Ed.). (1990). *Crime trends in Sweden, 1988*. Stockholm, Sweden: National Council for Crime Prevention.
- Smith, D. J. (1995). Youth crime and conduct disorders: Trends, patterns and causal explanations. In M. Rutter & D. J. Smith (Eds.), *Psychosocial disorders in youth populations: Time trends and their causes* (pp. 389–489). Chichester, UK: Wiley.
- Wikström, P.-O. (1985). *Everyday violence in contemporary Sweden: Situational and ecological aspects* (Report No. 2015). Stockholm, Sweden: National Council for Crime Prevention.
40. van Dijk, J.J.M., van Kesteren, J. N., & Smit, P. (2008). *Criminal victimization in international perspective: Key findings from the 2004–2005 ICVS and EU ICS*. The Hague, The Netherlands: Boom Legal Publishers.
41. Ibid.
42. Smith, P. K., Morita, Y., Junger-Tas, J., Olweus, D., Catalano, R., & Slee, P. (Eds.). (1999). *The nature of school bullying: A cross-national perspective*. New York, NY: Routledge.
43. Phillips, C. (2003). Who's who in the pecking order? Aggression and "normal violence" in the lives of girls and boys. *British Journal of Criminology*, 43(4), 710–728.
44. For example, see Sloan, J. H., Kellermann, A. L., Reay, D. T., Ferris, A. J., Rice, C. L., & LoGerfo, J. (1988). Handgun regulations, crime, assaults, and homicide: A tale of two cities. *New England Journal of Medicine*, 319, 1256–1262.
- Zimring, F. F. (2001). *American youth violence*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Zimring, F. F., & Hawkins, G. (1999). *Crime is not the problem: Lethal violence in America*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
45. For extra guidance in creating maps, see:
- Boba, R. (2008). *Crime analysis with crime mapping*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Chainey, S. P., & Ratcliffe, J. H. (2005). *GIS and crime mapping*. London, UK: Wiley.
- Harries, K. (1999). *Mapping crime: Principle and practice*. Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice.